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Editorial
The global as well as the euro-area economy is 
deteriorating fast.  It becomes increasingly likely 
that the global recession might continue for 
some time. Global trade is in free fall and output 
is contracting sharply. Unemployment is 
projected to rise significantly. After some 
improvement at the end of 2008, the crisis in 
financial markets intensified again at the 
beginning of 2009.  
Global as well as EU economic linkages are 
important through international trade, finance 
and investment. To maximize the effects of the 
different policy measures put in place to 
overcome the current crisis, our responses have 
to be coordinated globally. Our priorities should 
include the need to restore the functioning and 
integrity of international financial markets, to 
provide macroeconomic support, and the 
imperative to keep global markets open.  
Macroeconomic policies need to provide active 
support to the economy at this juncture. EU 
leaders met in Brussels on 19 and 20 March and 
reviewed the considerable fiscal stimulus now 
being injected into the EU economy (over 
€400 bn). The Council emphasised that 
concerted action and coordination were an 
essential part of Europe's strategy for recovery. A 
first assessment of the implementation of the 
December European Economic Recovery Plan 
(EERP) at the Member State level indicates that 
the fiscal and structural policy measures are well-
targeted and coordinated across the EU, taking 
into account the different economic and 
budgetary conditions of Member States. As the 
measures gain traction in the coming months 
they will tangibly support aggregate demand. 
Social safety nets and progressive tax systems are 
putting a powerful break to the fall in demand in 
the EU and will provide further substantial 
support should the economy deteriorate further. 
The working of these automatic stabilisers plays 
an important role for EU Member States, and 
their viability is essential for public confidence in 
the future. With the Stability and Growth Pact, 
the EU has an effective framework in place that 
combines the short-term flexibility required to 
counter the crisis with the credible commitment 
to fiscal sustainability. On the monetary front, 
the European Central Bank has lowered interest 
rates to historically low levels and is providing 
ample liquidity to the financial system. In light of 
receding inflation risks, the possibility of further 
monetary easing is not excluded. Overall, EU 
macroeconomic policies contribute sizeably to 
the global recovery. 
The EU is committed to keeping markets open 
and opposed to any form of protectionism. Our 
policies preserve the integrity of the internal 
market and ensure that rescue packages in the 
financial as well as non-financial sectors do not 
distort competition in the single market. 
Moreover, we contribute constructively to 
maintaining and enhancing free trade in the 
framework of the WTO and support progress in 
the Doha round. We also support initiatives to 
secure availability of trade financing. 
Restoring the functioning of credit markets and 
facilitating the flow of lending to the real 
economy is essential for the recovery of our 
economies. The EU has taken ambitious 
measures to stabilise the financial sector. These 
measures have helped to avoid a melt-down of 
global financial markets, but the process of 
financial deleveraging continues impairing the 
functioning of financial markets. Following 
common EU guidelines and monitored by the 
Commission, governments are re-capitalising 
distressed banks and providing large-scale 
guarantees for their credit operations. To ensure 
the level playing field in the EU, the European 
Commission has adopted further detailed 
guidelines for Member States regarding the 
design and implementation of asset-relief 
measures. In addition to the need for 
transparency and disclosure, the Commission's 
guidelines stress the importance of ex ante 
burden sharing agreements between the 
beneficiaries and the government and clear rules 
regarding the eligibility of assets in order to 
minimise the risk of moral hazard.  
Financial market participants are forward-looking 
actors. Short-term financial rescue action and 
regulatory reform of the financial sector must 
therefore go hand in hand to bolster confidence 
in the financial system. The EU has embarked on 
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reforms to ensure appropriate regulation and 
oversight of credit rating agencies, hedge funds 
and private equity as well as complex financial 
products. Moreover, the Commission will make 
proposals to reinforce the quality and quantity of 
prudential capital of banks in order to limit the 
level of leverage and mitigate excessive pro-
cyclicality of existing capital requirements. 
Finally, the EU will improve its supervisory 
system, building on the recommendations of the 
de Larosière Group. The supervisory system will 
combine much stronger oversight at EU level 
with a clear role for national supervisors. The 
Commission backs the Group's proposal to set 
up an early warning body under ECB auspices to 
identify and tackle systemic risks. Steps towards 
closer cooperation among EU supervisors 
include for example the establishment of 
supervisory colleges by the end of 2009. In our 
view, global action on regulation and supervision 
is urgently needed to keep the financial system 
integrated and assure its efficiency.  
The current economic crisis highlights the 
general need for broader and more in-depth 
macroeconomic surveillance. Global imbalances 
are among the root causes of the current crisis. 
Significant imbalances have also built up within 
the euro area, raising the exposure of some 
Member States to the global financial turmoil. In 
our EMU@10 report, we have argued the case 
for monitoring intra-euro area macroeconomic 
imbalances and underlying competitiveness 
developments. In the special report of this Issue, 
we build on this agenda and provide a 
comprehensive review and assessment of 
competitiveness developments in the euro area 
since the launch of the euro in 1999. Some 
Member States have seen significant falls in their 
domestic prices vis-à-vis the rest of the euro area 
while others have registered sharp rises. The 
diverging trend has also been visible in a steady 
widening of the differences in Member States' 
current account positions, which are at historical 
height.  
While some of the divergence can be explained 
by benign factors such as Balassa-Samuelson 
effects, differences in the business cycle and 
improved access to financing for catching up 
economies, the divergence trend also has more 
worrying causes. Wages have responded 
inappropriately to country-specific shocks in 
some Member States. Divergences of current 
accounts also reflect the build-up of domestic 
imbalances such as losses of non-price 
competitiveness, excessive domestic demand, 
high private sector and external debt and surges 
in house prices. Furthermore, foreign capital 
inflows to catching-up economies have not 
always been channelled to the most productive 
uses. Some of the domestic imbalances 
underlying the competitiveness problems – 
particularly excessive private-sector debt and 
elevated house prices – have also increased the 
vulnerability to financial market conditions and 
have aggravated the exposure to the current 
crisis. 
The adjustment of these external imbalances will 
involve reductions in production costs and prices 
in the export sector. It will also imply significant 
changes in the domestic part of the economy, 
including a re-allocation of demand and 
productive resources between the sheltered 
sector and the export sector as well changes in 
relative prices. The speed and the economic cost 
of the adjustment will depend on price and wage 
flexibility as well as the ease with which resources 
can be re-allocated across sectors. 
While the economic crisis is projected to lead to 
some adjustment in external imbalances, price 
adjustments are lagging behind, at least in some 
Member States. This suggests that the economic 
cost in terms of unemployment could be 
significant in the years to come, unless more 
decisive policy action is taken, in particular 
regarding the adjustment capacities of markets.  
Eurogroup finance ministers agreed that 
competitiveness developments in the euro area 
are a matter of common concern that warrants a 
broader surveillance. Such macroeconomic 
surveillance should identify risks of divergence 
early on and contribute to their orderly 
unwinding.  
We live in difficult times. I am, however, 
convinced that we have the right institutions and 
capacities to make the EU emerge stronger from 
the crisis. 
MARCO BUTI 
DIRECTOR GENERAL   
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I. Economic and financial situation in the euro area1 
After some improvement at the end of 2008, the crisis in financial markets intensified again at the beginning of 2009. This 
was reflected in falling stock prices, widening credit market spreads and strong safe haven flows. Loans to the private sector 
have moderated considerably, reflecting very weak growth in household credit and the first signs of deleveraging in the non-
financial corporate sector. Although some markets have recently shown some signs of improvement, conditions in the financial 
sector remain extremely fragile.  
Financial market sentiment is now clearly being hampered by the worsening real economy. In the last quarter of 2008, euro-
area GDP fell by 1.5% (q-o-q), the worst performance in decades. With the notable exception of inventories, all GDP 
components were down, with investment exhibiting the sharpest drop (-2.7% q-o-q) and construction and business investment 
both strongly hit. World trade has been severely affected by the collapse in global demand, which is also starting to weigh 
heavily on emerging economies. Short-term prospects are not encouraging. In February all euro-area survey indicators showed 
another drop to new record lows. A few global and euro-area sentiment indicators sent very modest signs of improvement in, 
respectively, February and March but more solid evidence is needed before concluding that the economy is stabilising.  
Headline inflation came sharply down in 2008Q4 and stood at 1.2% in February. This was the result of falling energy and 
food commodity prices, weakening demand and base effects. These base effects will last for some months and may lead to 
negative inflation rates during the first two quarters of 2009.  
In response to the ongoing crisis, major policy measures have been put in place in the EU. Last autumn, EU Member States 
agreed on coordinated European action to recapitalise and guarantee banks across the EU. These measures, together with 
considerable liquidity injections by the ECB and other EU central banks, have prevented the meltdown of the banking 
industry. Nevertheless, additional measures are needed to clean up banks’ balance sheets. The Commission has therefore 
adopted detailed guidelines on the design and implementation of asset-relief measures. As regards the European Economic 
Recovery Plan adopted in December, the full impact will only become visible in the coming months but the early signs are 
encouraging; most of the measures taken by Member States, as requested, being well targeted to stimulate demand.  
 
1 The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue was 25 March 2009. 
Following a two-month period of gradual 
improvement at the end of 2008, the crisis in 
financial markets intensified again at the 
beginning of 2009. This was reflected in falling 
stock prices, widening credit market spreads and 
strong safe haven flows. In exchange markets, the 
renewed increase in risk aversion supported the 
US dollar and the Japanese yen. In recent weeks, 
some markets have shown signs of relief, in 
particular interbank markets, partly as a result of 
important policy measures undertaken by 
governments and central banks. Some 
improvements have also been seen in stock 
markets with prices rebounding significantly in 
March and volatility ebbing somewhat from its 
very high level. Yet, conditions in the global 
financial system remain extremely fragile, not 
least because the interaction between financial 
markets and the real economy works in both 
directions, and financial market sentiment is 
hampered by the worsening real economy.  
Significant monetary loosening   
Monetary policy has been significantly loosened 
in the last quarter. With reduced inflationary 
pressure amid the intensification of the financial 
market turmoil and the weakening in economic 
activity, the Governing Council of the ECB 
reduced the main refinancing rate from 3.25% at 
the beginning of December 2008 to 1.5% in 
March 2009. The lower policy rates, in 
combination with comprehensive liquidity 
injections and government guarantees, helped to 
calm interbank markets. Euro-area interbank 
rates have steadily declined since December. The 
3-month Euribor has come down from 3.25% in 
mid-December 2008 to 1.54% on 25 March 2009 
(Graph 1).  
The decline in rates on the interbank market 
mainly reflects a relatively continuous downward 
movement in risk-free rates, as 3-month 
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interbank spreads, measured as the difference 
between unsecured money market rates and risk-
free interest rates with similar maturity, have 
been decreasing only slightly to around 80 bp 
since the end of January. This is significantly 
lower than the peak of 200 bp in October, but 
much higher than in the pre-crisis period. 
Although there is a large amount of liquidity in 
the system, banks reported in the ECB January 
Bank Lending Survey that their access to money 
markets remained hampered at elevated levels 
due to the financial turmoil. 
Graph 1: Euro-area money market  
(in %, 1 Jan 2007 to 25 Mar 2009) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
In the bond markets, sovereign bond yields have 
fluctuated strongly in recent months. Yields on 
the German 10-year Bund reached a low of 
2.88% in mid-January 2009, before increasing to 
3.42% on 9 February, amid speculation that the 
ECB policy rate may not be cut much further and 
in anticipation by the market of higher 
government borrowing in the coming quarters. 
Since then the 10-year Bund yield has registered a 
marked fall to 3.13% on 25 March 2009, related 
to lower growth forecasts. 
In some euro-area countries, government 
borrowing costs have climbed more markedly 
since mid-January as yield spreads relative to the 
German Bund have widened further (Graph 2). 
The spread increase reflects both liquidity-risk 
and credit-risk premiums and has been amplified 
by the announcement of a coordinated EU rescue 
package for banks, which has different 
implications for Member States' credit quality, 
depending on the scale of the problems in their 
banking sectors and their capacity to meet the 
implied budgetary obligations. A downgrade of 
long-term credit ratings for Greek, Portuguese 
and Spanish sovereign debt contributed further 
to the increase in spreads in January. In addition, 
euro-area banks' exposure to former Eastern 
European countries has added to the spreads in 
some euro-area countries. On 25 March, the 
sovereign spreads over the German Bund were 
highest in Greece (264 bp) and Ireland (253 bp) .  
Graph 2: 10-year government bond spreads to Germany 
(in bp, 1 Jan 2007 to 25 Mar 2009) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
The deceleration in bank lending spreads to 
non-financial corporations 
The intensification of the financial turmoil since 
mid-September, including its substantial spill-over 
effects to the real economy, increasingly affects 
the pace of monetary expansion. Whereas up to 
the third quarter 2008 no signs of deleveraging by 
banks could be observed, in recent months clear 
evidence of deleveraging activities has been 
visible. These are reflected in the considerable 
reduction in the external asset position.  
Households reacted to the increased financial 
stress by shifting, for precautionary reasons, 
assets into more liquid and safer assets. This 
portfolio rebalancing relates to government 
guarantees for bank deposits, but it has also been 
driven by the diminishing opportunity costs of 
holding more liquid assets due to monetary policy 
loosening. By contrast, non-financial 
corporations have had to reduce their liquidity 
holdings due to worsening profit developments.  
Up to February 2009, broad money growth 
declined to 5.9% year-on-year, down from 7.5% 
in December 2008 and 12.3% at its peak in 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 7 - 
October 2007. The three-month average of the 
annual growth rate of M3 is currently at 6.5%. 
Against that, the flow of loans granted to the 
private sector has moderated considerably. The 
annual growth rate for loans to the private sector 
decreased to 4.2% in February, from 5.8% in 
December. The slowdown is likely to be mainly 
influenced by demand factors such as the 
moderation of economic activity and the 
contracting housing market.2 Looking at euro-
area GDP growth and loan growth to the private 
sector (Graph 3), the co-movement for the last 
ten years is striking. The strong slowdown in loan 
growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 reflects the 
comparable downturn in GDP growth. 
Graph 3: Private sector loans and real GDP  
(annualised q-o-q growth in %– 1998Q1 to 2008Q4) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
Supply-side factors as measured by banks' credit 
conditions may also have contributed to the 
moderation in lending. The January 2009 ECB 
bank lending survey for the euro area reported a 
further sharp tightening of credit standards for 
loans to non-financial corporations and to 
households – by a similar magnitude as in the 
third quarter of 2008. Moreover, banks' cost of 
funds increased and the tightening in non-price 
terms and conditions remained high, reaching 
levels similar to those prevailing in 2003. 
                                                     
2 For determinants of money demand in the euro area, see 
R. Setzer and G.B. Wolff, 2009, 'Money demand in the 
euro area: new evidence from disaggregated data', 
European Economy, Economic Paper, No 373; a specific study 
on housing is C. Greiber, R. Setzer, 2007, 'Money and 
housing: evidence for the euro area and the US', Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Discussion Paper 12-2007. 
The deceleration in bank lending is now affecting 
both non-financial corporations and households. 
Annual growth in lending to non-financial 
corporations still stands at a high level, with 7.6% 
year-on-year in February, however, the lending 
cycle has shifted towards deceleration. The 
2 percentage-point monthly deceleration 
registered between November and December 
2008 was the largest since 2000. To a certain 
extent, however, this figure overstates the 
slowdown since it is partly attributable to 
window dressing operations by banks at the end 
of the year. Monthly flows turned positive again 
in January. Bank lending to households has been 
restrained for some time already, largely as a 
result of the moderate increase in lending for 
house purchase. Over the 12 months to January 
2009, it grew by just 0.7%. 
Overall, this suggests that the feedback loop 
from economic activity on financial markets has 
materialised. However, there is as yet no clear 
indication of any immediate drying-up of the 
availability of loans.  
Despite their recent rebound, equity prices 
are down compared with end-2008  
The current bank loan data may be biased 
somewhat to the upside as alternative sources of 
funding (in particular equity financing) have dried 
up. Euro-area equity prices have fallen in the 
period under review amidst weak data releases 
for the real economy and disappointing company 
results (Graph 4). Volatility in stock markets 
remains very high, reflecting heightened risk 
aversion amid the ongoing uncertainty 
surrounding the financial markets and the real 
economy. As at 25 March 2009, the Eurostoxx50 
had declined by 16% in 2009, but had remarkably 
recovered from its low on 6 March, providing a 
very tentative sign that the worst of the crisis 
could be over.  
Since the beginning of the crisis, the Eurostoxx 
sub-index for financial institutions has in general 
underperformed against the overall index. This 
negative performance gap has not widened in 
recent months, suggesting that markets are not 
expecting a further relative deterioration in the 
outlook for banking-sector profitability. Still, 
share prices of financial institutions with 
significant exposure to Central and Eastern 
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European countries have been particularly 
affected, as the heavy reliance on short-term 
foreign funding makes some countries in this 
region vulnerable to sudden capital stops. 
Measured in terms of GDP, euro-area banks 
from Austria, Sweden and Belgium have the 
largest exposure to the new EU countries and the 
other European emerging markets. 
Graph 4: Stock prices and implied volatility of stock 
prices (Index Jan 2007 = 100 for stock prices, data for 
2 Jan 2007 to 25 Mar 2009) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
 
Graph 5: Corporate bond spreads, euro area 
(in bp, 1 Jan 2007 to 25 March 2009) 
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Source: Ecowin. 
The fall in demand and the ongoing correction in 
asset prices put corporations' balance sheets 
under financial strain and lead to a deterioration 
in borrowing conditions. Default expectations 
for the corporate sector have stabilised at peak 
levels, suggesting that significant concerns over 
credit quality remain. Yet, corporate bond 
spreads seem to have reached a ceiling with 
spreads on the more risky corporate bonds 
receding moderately in the last two months. On 
25 March, AAA spreads were around 104 bp 
above the government benchmark, and BBB 
spreads were at 376 bp (Graph 5).  
According to the European Commission's 
Composite Financing Cost Indicator (CFCI), 
euro-area financing costs for non-financial 
corporations and households have both declined 
by more than 40 bp since the peak in October 
(Graph 6). For non-financial corporations, the 
declining costs of bank loans and market debt 
exceeded the rising costs of equity capital due to 
lower stock prices. For households, the fall in 
both retail and market interest rates has caused 
financial costs to decline significantly, offsetting 
the rise in financing conditions in the previous 
quarters. As a result, the CFCI for households is 
currently at its lowest level since July 2007.  
Graph 6: Composite financial indicator, euro area 
(in % – Mar 2003 to Jan 2009) 
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Source: Ecowin. 
Restoring the functioning and integrity of 
financial markets  
A stable financial sector is a prerequisite for 
building sustainable recovery. Last autumn, EU 
Member States agreed on coordinated European 
action to recapitalise and guarantee banks across 
the EU. These measures, together with 
considerable liquidity injections by the ECB and 
other EU central banks, prevented the meltdown 
of the European banking industry and helped to 
restore some of the liquidity in interbank 
markets. In particular, the aggregate level of bank 
capital in the EU increased slightly during the 
second half of 2008 as government capital 
injections more than offset asset write-downs.  
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Nevertheless, confidence has remained low in 
financial markets. The Commission has 
presented legislative proposals to improve 
protection for bank depositors, make credit 
ratings more reliable, get the incentives right in 
securitisation markets, and reinforce the solidity 
and supervision of banks and insurance 
companies. Adjustments to the accounting rules 
were rapidly agreed in order to limit excessive 
pro-cyclicality and put European financial 
institutions on a level playing field with their 
international competitors.  
Further efforts are needed to clean up banks' 
balance sheets. To restore confidence, banks with 
impaired assets should disclose them to the 
competent authorities. Building on the guidance 
already given on the application of State aid rules 
to measures to support and recapitalise financial 
institutions, the Commission presented a 
Communication in February to help Member 
States design measures for dealing with impaired 
assets. Options include asset purchase (“bad 
bank”), asset insurance, asset swap and hybrid 
solutions. It is for the Member State to decide 
whether or not to use these tools and how they 
are designed. However, the commission has 
provided guidance on the basis of a number of 
principles: i) full transparency and disclosure of 
impairments prior to government intervention; 
ii) a coordinated approach to the identification of 
assets eligible; iii) a coordinated approach to 
valuation of assets, based on common principles; 
iv) adequate burden-sharing of the costs between 
the State, shareholders and the creditors; and 
v) appropriate restructuring with a view to the 
long-term viability and normal functioning of the 
banking industry.  
But a common and coordinated European 
framework, based on the principles of ex ante 
full transparency and disclosure prior to State 
intervention, a coordinated approach to the 
identification of assets eligible for asset relief 
measures and their valuation, burden sharing and 
adequate remuneration for the State will help to 
ensure asset relief measures have the maximum 
effect. The framework will ensure a level playing 
field between banks, facilitate compliance with 
State aid rules, limit the impact on public 
finances and help prepare for the necessary 
restructuring of the sector.  
Looking ahead, it is important for the EU 
economy, to ensure that financial markets 
function efficiently and reliably. The Commission 
will therefore propose later this years an 
ambitious reform of the European financial 
system, which will ensure that all stakeholders 
and all types of financial instrument are subject 
to appropriate regulation and oversight. It will be 
grounded in the values of responsibility, integrity, 
transparency and consistency.  
The downturn in real activity has accelerated 
and deepened  
In the last quarter of 2008, the euro area 
experienced the sharpest fall in activity since the 
start of EMU and the worst performance in 
decades. GDP fell by 1.5% (q-o-q) after having 
contracted by 0.2% in 2008Q2 and 0.2% in  
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2008 Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
Carryover 
to 2009 
2009 (2) 2010 (2) 
 Percentage  change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.7 -0.2 -0.2 -1.5 -1.3 -1.9 0.4 
Private consumption 0.1 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 
Government consumption 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.7 1.6 1.2 
Gross fixed capital formation 1.2 -1.2 -0.6 -3.7 -3.4 -5.5 -0.7 
Exports of goods and services 1.6 -0.1 -0.1 -6.4 -5.0 -4.3 1.2 
Imports of goods and services 1.2 -0.5 1.3 -4.7 -3.1 -2.6 0.9 
 Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 
Government consumption 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.8 -0.7 -1.2 -0.1 
Changes in inventories 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.1 
Net exports 0.2 0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8 0.0 
(1) Annual change in %.   (2) European Commission January 2009 interim forecasts.  
Source: Commission services. 
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2008Q3. The contraction was broad-based across 
euro-area countries, with only Cyprus, Greece 
and Slovakia exhibiting positive growth rates. 
The magnitude of the contraction was, however 
quite different depending on the Member States 
considered. The sharpest falls were recorded in 
Ireland (-7.1%), Slovenia (-4.1%), Germany         
(-2.1%) and Italy (-1.8%). In France, GDP fell by 
1.2% and in Spain by 1%. In the euro area as 
whole, all GDP components but inventories and 
government consumption were down in the 
fourth quarter, with investment exhibiting the 
sharpest drop. Changes in inventories surprised 
on the upside and contributed positively to 
growth (Graph 7). Destocking could therefore 
add substantial downside pressures on activity in 
the first months of 2009.  
Graph 7: Contributions to real GDP growth, euro area 
(q-o-q contributions in pp – 2007q1 to 2008q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Strong contraction in domestic demand 
Household consumption, which had increased 
slightly in Q3, contracted by 0.3% in the last 
quarter of 2008, in line with a strong deceleration 
in consumer credit during that same period. The 
contraction in consumption reflects deteriorating 
economic conditions and, particularly, negative 
developments on the labour market. Job losses in 
the euro area amounted to 540 000 in 2008Q4 
and the unemployment rate increased from 7.5% 
in the third quarter to 8% in the last quarter of 
2008. Data on household savings are not 
available for the fourth quarter yet but the fact 
that consumption experienced a smaller 
contraction than GDP is probably mostly due to 
a strong fall in consumer price inflation (which 
pushed consumption by more than 0.5% q-o-q) 
and some support from household disposable 
income. The latter benefited from automatic 
stabilisers and the fact that wages generally 
respond to a downturn with a significant lag.  
Prospects for consumption at the beginning of 
2009 appear rather gloomy. Unemployment 
increased further in January (8.2%) and 
industrialists' employment expectations have 
dropped sharply in both industry and the services 
sector since the end of last year. Consistent with 
these negative developments, consumer 
confidence fell to new all-time lows in February, 
with unemployment expectations increasing 
again strongly (Graph 8).  
 Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2008-2009 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average       101 0.00   85.4 52.8 55.0 96.8 -9.5 26.5 
March 2008 100.5 0.83 110.4 52.6 53.1 101.2 1.1 -32.0 
April 2008 98.1 0.49 110.3 52.8 50.6 98.7 -7.4 -40.7 
May 2008 98.5 0.62 110.2 52.3 52.3 98.3 0.0 -41.4 
June 2008 95.9 0.21 109.9 52.0 51.6 95.1 -6.4 -52.4 
July 2008 90.9 -0.10 109.6 50.7 52.0 90.1 -8.1 -63.9 
August 2008 89.9 -0.16 109.2 50.6 50.6 87.4 -5.6 -55.5 
September 2008 88.9 -0.67 108.7 49.2 49.1 85.7 -15.8 -41.1 
October 2008 81.6 -1.18 108.0 47.4 48.3 78.8 -14.9 -63.0 
November 2008 76.8 -1.93 107.2 47.6 48.5 74.1 -27.1 -53.5 
December 2008 68.9 -2.95 106.4 45.0 48.4 74.0 -36.5 -45.2 
January 2009 67.2 -3.03    105.5 41.1 45.8 79.4 -30.3 -31 
February 2009 65.4 -3.51  33.5 39.2 82.6 -36.8 -5.8 
March 2009    34.0* 40.1* 83.7 -33.6 -3.5 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator. 4) Reuters 
Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, West Germany. 7)  
National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment, Germany 
* Flash Estimates 
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Graph 8: Household consumption and unemployment 
expectations, euro area (1996q1 – 2008q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Together with trade, investment was the most 
important source of demand contraction in the 
fourth quarter. Gross fixed capital formation 
contracted by 3.7% (q-o-q); this was the third 
consecutive negative growth rate. In the third 
quarter of 2008, the contraction in investment 
had mainly been the result of the fall in housing 
investment. In the fourth quarter, the strong 
investment contraction in 2008Q4 was the result 
of the combined effect of a fall in housing and 
productive investment (i.e. mostly business 
investment). Graph 9 shows a relatively strong 
correlation between business investment and 
production expectations in the manufacturing 
sector. It points to a further sharp contraction in 
investment during the first months of 2008.  
Graph 9: Business investment and production 
expectations in the manufacturing sector, euro area 
(1996q1 – 2008q4) 
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(1) Total investment minus residential constructions.  
Source: Commission services. 
The ongoing slump in business investment is the 
response of firms to vanishing demand and 
decreasing profits. Firms are facing falling 
capacity utilisation. In January, the capacity 
utilisation in the euro-area manufacturing sector 
was 75%, the lowest rate since the beginning of 
the surveys in 1990. Recent falls in interest rates 
have made it cheaper for euro-area firms to 
borrow, but the reduced availability of credit and 
tighter lending conditions are likely to have also 
contributed to the contraction in investment.   
Inventory accumulation added 0.3 pp to GDP 
growth in the fourth quarter but this comes with 
downside risks to activity in the months ahead. 
Rapid inventory built-up at times of sharp GDP 
contraction suggests that producers have been 
surprised by the scale of the slump in demand 
and have accumulated more inventories and 
unsold goods than usually. The interpretation is 
also in line with the high level of stocks reported 
in manufacturing surveys. This means that 
further larger production cuts will be needed in 
2009Q1 in order to bring stocks down.  
Hard and soft data point to another strong 
contraction in 2009Q1 
For the euro area, the short-term economic 
prospects are not encouraging. While some 
indicators gave some hope of stabilisation in 
January, the February reading of all survey 
indicators concurred to show another drop in 
confidence. In February, the Commission's 
Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) fell again, 
albeit at a slower pace than in the last months of 
2008, and reached another record low. In 
December, the ESI had already fallen below the 
trough reached during the 1992-93 recession. 
The fall in the ESI in February was the result of a 
general decline in confidence in all sectors, 
except for retail trade, which improved slightly. 
The PMIs for both manufacturing and services in 
the euro area fell again in February, reaching new 
record lows.  
More recently, some indicators have begun to 
improve very modestly. The Flash estimate for 
March shows a slight increase in the PMIs for 
both manufacturing and services although the 
indexes remain close to their February trough. 
The IFO index eased again in March. But while 
the assessment of current conditions declined 
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further, business expectations rose for the third 
consecutive quarter. These improvements are 
obviously positive but further data will be needed 
before concluding that the economy is stabilising. 
The ESI level for January and February is 
consistent with a contraction in growth of -1.0% 
in the first quarter of 2009. The ESI has generally 
been a good GDP growth tracker (Graph 10). 
However, a gap seems to have opened lately 
between what confidence indicators suggest and 
quarterly GDP growth. For example, in 2008Q4, 
the ESI was consistent with a q-o-q GDP 
contraction of 0.6%, far from the -1.5%. This 
could be explained by the fact that the ESI is 
currently at unprecedented low levels and that 
the familiar linear relation between the two 
variables no longer holds good in the current 
circumstances. Therefore, downside risks to the 
estimated 2009Q1 growth rate are quite high. 
These risks are confirmed by the first 2009 
reading of industrial production. In January, the 
speed of contraction of industrial output 
accelerated further, with a drop of 17.3% 
compared to a year before. This was the fifth 
consecutive negative growth rate. Judging by 
these figures, the pace of GDP contraction in 
2009Q1 could be substantially larger than 
predicted by the ESI. 
Graph 10: GDP growth and the Economic Sentiment 
Indicator, euro area  (in % – 1996q2 – 2008q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Rapidly deteriorating global trade 
The global economy deteriorated significantly in 
2008Q4. Major advanced economies contracted 
sharply: the US GDP fell by 1.6% (q-o-q) and the 
Japanese by 3.3%. The collapse in global 
commodity prices and the sharp decline in 
external demand have started to weigh heavily on 
emerging economies. In China, q-o-q GDP 
growth decelerated to 6.8% in 2008Q4, after 9% 
in the third quarter. In Korea, GDP contracted 
by 5.6% in 2008Q4 and in Brazil by 3.6%.  
The rapidly deteriorating global economy has 
severely affected international trade (Graph 11). 
According to estimates by the Netherlands 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, world trade 
contracted strongly in the fourth quarter (-6% q-
o-q) after moderate but still positive growth in 
the third quarter (2.1%). This was the largest q-o-
q contraction in the history of this series. Among 
the main industrialised economies, exports 
contracted by 15.2% (q-o-q) in Japan and by 
10.8% in the US. Emerging economies also 
experienced a large drop in their exports (5.8%). 
The decline in volume was accompanied by a fall 
in USD trade prices of more than 16% (q-o-q) 
following the strong fall in commodity prices, in 
global demand and the appreciation of the USD. 
Graph 11: World trade and PMI 
(July 1998 to December 2008) 
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(1) World trade data cover the period Jul.1998 to Dec. 2008.  
Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis and 
Reuters.  
In the euro area, exports and imports also 
collapsed in the fourth quarter (-6.4% q-o-q and  
-4.7% respectively), leading to a negative 
contribution to GDP growth of 0.8%. While the 
contraction in trade was broad-based across 
countries, there were large differences in the 
declines in exports and imports and the trade 
performance played an important role in the 
variation of GDP growth outcomes across 
Member States. It explains, for instance, the large  
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 Box 1: Impact of the depreciation of the UK pound on the euro area economy  
 
The British pound has been one of the major currencies most negatively affected by the global deleveraging flows 
since the onset of the financial market crisis. The pound's real effective exchange rate depreciated by 20% in 2008 
and by 23% since July 2007. Against the euro, the fall has been even stronger: The euro rose to a record high of 
0.98 against the pound on 30 December 2008, up from 0.73 a year ago (+34%). Half of the pound's depreciation 
occurred in December 2008. The key factors underpinning the broad-based weakness of the pound were related 
to concerns about the United Kingdom's twin deficit (a large trade deficit coupled with a growing budget deficit, 
including large contingent liabilities), fears that the recession in the United Kingdom will be deeper than in other 
advanced economies, and sharp interest rate cuts by the Bank of England. In 2009, speculation about whether the 
euro-pound rate could reach 1.00 has faded. The euro-pound rate has remained volatile, but declined to 0.93 (25 
March).  
 
REER and NEER of the UK Pound vs 41 countries 
(Jan 2006 to Feb 2009, Jan 2006 = 100) 
EUR/GBP and interest rate differential 
(daily data, interest rate differential in basis points) 
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There are three potential channels of transmission by which the sharp pound depreciation exerts an impact on 
the euro-area economy. The first relates to a change in international price competitiveness. The UK is an 
important trading partner for the euro area, receiving 15.3% of all extra-euro-area exports of goods. The UK, in 
turn, is the source of 11.3% of euro-area imports (data as at 2007). Estimated export and import equations for the 
euro area suggest that the pound’s depreciation since the end of 2006 might lead to a 1% drop in the level of total 
euro-area exports compared to the baseline after one year and a 1.25% drop after two years. The exchange rate 
elasticity of euro-area imports is considerably lower than for exports. The pound’s depreciation will therefore only 
entail a 0.3-0.35% increase in extra-euro-area imports. At Member State level, Ireland is by far the country most 
exposed to UK trade flows, but also Cyprus, Malta, the Netherlands and Belgium have a sizeable part of their 
trade with the UK.  
Second, the pound’s depreciation exerts some downward pressure on consumer prices via reduced import prices. 
In the current low-inflation environment, the degree of exchange rate pass-through to prices is, however, likely to 
be minor since price adjustment costs could prevent small changes in prices. Moreover, the bulk of the euro area-
UK trade is in highly differentiated manufactured products for which the exchange rate pass-through is generally 
assumed to be lower than for homogenous products, such as primary commodities. These considerations are also 
in line with the recent development in UK export prices, which have reacted only sluggishly to the sharp pound 
depreciation. 
The third transmission channel operates though the balance sheets of the euro-area corporate sector. Euro-area 
investors have invested heavily in the UK. An appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the pound results in a loss of 
value of these investments as well as in the revenue stream from these investments. Euro investors held 3 027 bn 
euro of assets (FDI, portfolio and other assets) in the UK as at 31 December 2006.* This amounted to 52% of 
total foreign holdings of UK assets (compared to 24% for the US). The 20% appreciation of the euro against the 
pound from the end of 2006 to March 2008 could then have led to substantial wealth losses of around 600 bn 
euro. It should be noted, however, that euro-area investors can hedge against the risk of pound depreciation and 
thus the valuation losses could be less than proportional to the total depreciation of the pound against the euro.  
 
* See UK Statistics authority, 'The pink book', 2008. 
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difference in growth between Germany and 
Spain in 2008Q4. The main causes of the strong 
deterioration in international trade were evidently 
the fall in global demand, but also the drying-up 
of trade financing and, possibly, high exchange 
rate volatility. 
Exchange rate developments in recent months 
have indeed been marked by high volatility and 
sudden trend reversals. With the financial, 
economic and fiscal outlook deteriorating further 
worldwide, repatriation and flight to safety flows 
have risen again in 2009. In February, the 
effective exchange rate of the euro against its 41 
major trading partners stood about 5% above its 
value in November 2008 (Graph 11). In real 
effective terms, i.e. taking into account inflation 
differentials between the euro area and its trading 
partners, the effective exchange rate of the euro 
has increased by 6% in the last three months. 
The real effective exchange rate of the euro is 
currently some 7% above historical averages. 
Graph 12: Nominal (NEER) and real (REER) effective 
exchange rate of the euro 
(Jan 2006 to Feb 2009, index Jan 2006=100) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
The rise in the external value of the euro in the 
last quarter is the result of significant movements 
in the bilateral exchange rates of the euro against 
the world's major currencies. The euro 
appreciated significantly against the British 
pound (see Box 1 on the ‘Impact of the 
depreciation of the UK pound on the euro-area 
economy') and the new EU Member States with 
a flexible exchange rate system as sentiment 
towards Eastern European countries has turned 
negative due to collapsing exports and the 
drying-up of capital inflows. By contrast, the 
euro depreciated against the US dollar in 2009 
(by 3% up to 25 March 2009) amid the rapid 
scaling down of prospects for the euro-area 
economy, the lowering of euro-area policy 
interest rates, credit rating downgrades of some 
euro-area sovereigns and spill-over effects from 
Eastern European difficulties. More recently, 
there have, however, also been downward 
pressures on the US dollar due to increasing 
concerns about the sustainability of the currency, 
in particular since the Federal Reserve 
announced its programme of asset purchases 
including treasuries.  
Looking ahead, developments in trade are not 
expected to improve in the very near future. The 
latest World Economic Survey, for example, 
showed further deterioration in February mainly 
due to a worsening of assessments of the current 
economic situation. On a slightly more upbeat 
note, however, a few indicators have recently 
begun to send more positive signals while 
remaining close to their all-time troughs. In 
February, both the expectations component of 
the World Economic Survey and the Global 
Manufacturing PMI improved somewhat while 
remaining in contraction territory. The Baltic Dry 
Index, another leading indicator of global trade 
activity, also increased slightly in February and 
March. It is clearly much too early to tell whether 
these modest improvements presage some kind 
of stabilisation in the global economy.  
Another steep decline in inflation 
Weaker domestic and external demand 
accompanied by falling energy and food 
commodity prices has led to a steep decline in 
inflation in the euro area. Headline HICP 
inflation came down sharply to 2.3% in the last 
quarter of 2008, down from 3.8% in Q3. It 
decelerated further at the beginning of 2009, 
reaching 1.1% in January before picking up 
slightly to 1.2% in February. The steep decline in 
annual inflation in recent months is partly due to 
the 'unusually' strong price increases experienced 
a year ago, which constitute the point of  
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Box 2: Accounting for the impact of base effects on current and future inflation developments 
 
Developments in the annual inflation rate depend on both current and past price developments. The change in 
annual inflation between month t-1 and month t can be approximated by the following expression: 
 
121 −− −=− tttt μμππ  ,  
 
with [ ] 100ln ln 1 ×−= −ttt PPμ , 
 
where π, μ and P are annual inflation, monthly inflation and the price index respectively*. The first term on the 
right-hand side is thus month-on-month inflation in month t, which is added to the annual inflation rate of month t-
1, while the second term corresponds to the month-on-month inflation a year earlier (i.e . between month t-12 and t-
13), which drops out from the year-on-year price level comparison in month t. This latter term is the so-called base 
effect. This equation highlights two relevant points: 1) fluctuations in the annual inflation rate can be attributed 
either to current price developments (i.e. between t and t-1) or to past price developments (i.e. between t-12 and t-
13). In particular, strong price level growth between consecutive months a year earlier, implying that μt<μt-12, will 
cause annual inflation to fall. A ' low' – and possibly negative – rate of inflation can thus be the result of 'low' m-o-m 
inflation in the current month or 'high' m-o-m inflation a year earlier; 2) in month t, the 'base effect' is known for the 
next 12 months, as the current m-o-m inflation will become next year's base effect. The current January 2009 m-o-m 
inflation will thus become the base effect of the January 2010 annual inflation. 
 
Base effects can be considered to be 'strong' if they reflect some 'unusual' price changes in a given month. There are 
various techniques to identify deviations from the 'usual' m-o-m rate change. In this analysis, the 'usual' m-o-m 
inflation is defined as the average m-o-m price change for each calendar month, observed since 1999. The difference 
between the non-seasonally adjusted m-o-m inflation rate and this average then constitutes the part of the base 
effect that entails the fluctuations in the annual inflation rate. The left graph below shows the evolution of m-o-m 
inflation between January 2008 and February 2009 as well as the average m-o-m inflation for each calendar month. It 
illustrates quite clearly that m-o-m inflation between March and June 2008 was exceptionally high (due to rising food 
and energy prices). The graph on the right shows that this upward deviation will have a strong downward impact in 
the form of negative base effects on the y-o-y inflation one year later, i.e. between March and June 2009. With a low 
initial level of inflation and m-o-m price changes close to their usual level, this implies that inflation rates may 
become negative during that period. Conversely, m-o-m inflation was unusually low in the second part of 2008, as 
food and energy prices came down sharply. Consequently, base effects will have a positive effect on y-o-y inflation 
from July 2009 onwards that will become particularly strong towards the end of the year. 
 
Euro-area m-o-m inflation  
(in % – Jan 2008 to Feb 2009) 
Contribution of base effects to euro-area HICP 
inflation (in pp – Jan 2009 to Feb 2010) 
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*see ECB Monthly Bulletin, January 2005 (Box 3) for a more detailed presentation. 
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reference for measurements of the annual price 
growth. The negative contribution to the 
inflation rate of these so-called base effects will 
last for some months, possibly implying some 
months of negative inflation rates, before adding 
again to inflation as of summer 2009 (see Box 2).  
The decrease in inflation observed in the second 
half of 2008 mainly reflects a sharp drop in 
commodity prices. Energy inflation stood at 
17.1% in July 2008 and subsequently plunged to -
4.8% in February 2009, a development that can 
be attributed to the fall in oil prices. The price of 
a barrel of Brent crude oil plummeted from a 
high of USD 134.7 (EUR 85.4) on average in July 
2008 to USD 43.6 (EUR 34.1) in February. 
Processed and unprocessed food price inflation 
also fell during the two last quarters of 2008 
from their peaks of July 2008 (7.2% and 4.4% 
respectively). Figures for January and February 
2009 show that this downward trend continued 
at the beginning of the year, with processed and 
unprocessed food inflation at 1.9% and 3.2% 
respectively.  
Graph 13: Euro-area HICP inflation: composition  
 (in % –  Jan 2006 to Feb 2009) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Inflation in non-energy industrial goods and in 
services remained stable at around 0.8% and 
2.6% respectively throughout all four quarters of 
2008. Accordingly, some price aggregates 
capturing core inflation, such as HICP excluding 
energy and unprocessed food, and the trimmed 
mean, remained quite stable throughout 2008 
even if a slight deceleration can be seen in the 
last quarter of the year. In February, annual 
growth in the two price aggregates was 1.7% and 
2.3% respectively. 
The euro-area inflation pattern in 2008 is 
mimicked in the individual Member States and, 
compared to the previous year, annual inflation 
in February 2009 was lower everywhere. Over 
the past year, inflation has declined by more than 
the euro-area average of 2.1 percentage points in 
eight euro-area Member States (Ireland, Greece, 
Spain, France, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Portugal 
and Slovenia). In February, the highest annual 
inflation was registered in Slovakia (2.4%), 
Finland (2.7%) and Malta (3.5%). The lowest 
annual inflation rates were recorded in Ireland 
and Portugal (both 0.1%), and Cyprus (0.6%).  
Graph 14: Producer prices on the domestic market,    
euro area   
 (y-o-y changes in %, Jan 2004 to Jan 2008) 
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Source: Commission services. 
As far as the supply side is concerned, producer 
prices in the euro area increased by an average of 
6.1% during 2008, with a peak of 9.1% in July 
and a low of 1.2% in December. The producer 
price index fell by 0.5% in January 2009 (y-o-y) 
The variation observed over the course of 2008 
essentially reflects changes in energy prices. The 
energy producer price sub-index increased by 
17.4% in Q2 and 21.7% in Q3, before 
decelerating to 6.3% in Q4. The worsening of the 
economic climate also induced falls in 
manufacturing and intermediate goods price 
inflation towards the end of 2008. Manufacturing 
price inflation fell from 7.3% in July to -3% in 
January, while intermediate goods price inflation 
fell from 5.5% to -0.9% over the same period. 
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The fiscal policy response is being put in 
place  
Against the background of a rapid deterioration 
in economic activity, another priority of the EU 
policy response to the crisis – on top of restoring 
the functioning of financial markets – is to 
provide adequate macroeconomic support to 
uphold demand. In December 2008, acting on 
proposals from the Commission, EU 
governments adopted an ambitious European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) consisting of 
two pillars: a major fiscal boost aimed at reviving 
demand and a set of structural reforms aimed at 
directing short-term action to bolstering 
Europe's adjustment capacity and 
competitiveness.3  
The full impact of the EERP will only become 
visible in the coming months, but the early signs 
are encouraging, in terms of both the volume of 
the stimulus and the direction of reforms. Most 
Member States have now adopted or announced 
fiscal stimulus measures. Overall support as 
measured by the increase in government debt 
amounts to 2.8% of GDP over the period 2009 
and 2010. This figure does not include purchases 
of assets from the financial sector in connection 
with the bank rescue packages. A large part of 
the fiscal support comes from the operation of 
automatic stabilisers, which are particularly 
strong in the EU. But it also comes from a 
discretionary fiscal stimulus of about 1.2% of 
GDP. A further 0.3% of GDP has been made 
available from EU sources.  Overall, the total 
fiscal support to the EU economy in 2009 will be 
larger than at any time since the 1970s.  
Most of the Member States' measures are well 
targeted to stimulate demand: support for 
households, business and employment, public 
investment and the modernisation of 
infrastructure. At the same time, most of the 
measures are consistent with the longer-term 
objectives identified in the country-specific 
recommendations under the Lisbon strategy for 
growth and jobs – such as building Europe's 
knowledge base, boosting energy security and 
adapting to a low-carbon economy. A 
comparison of policy responses across Member 
3  See 'A European Economic Recovery Plan', Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area, Vol.7 No 4 (2008) for more 
details.  
States shows significant differences, reflecting, at 
least in part, differences in Member States' 
respective economic and budgetary conditions. 
In particular, countries with large deficits and 
sizeable risk premiums on their sovereign debt 
have not gone in for sizeable fiscal stimulus 
packages.  
The EERP called for the stimulus measures to be 
timely, temporary and targeted. With a large part 
of these measures taking effect in 2009, the 
timeliness of the budgetary stimulus at political 
level appears to have been ensured. However, 
beyond any political decisions, the measures 
adopted are subject to implementation lags and 
further time will elapse before economic agents 
fully adjust their behaviour.  
Regarding structural reforms, Member States 
started to adjust priorities in response to the 
economic slowdown. Action generally centres on 
areas highlighted as potentially relevant in the 
EERP (e.g. improving active labour market 
policies and training) and appears to be in line 
with priorities under the Lisbon Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs. In particular, Member States 
are looking at a variety of measures to improve 
access to credit for businesses (e.g. credit 
guarantees) or to bolster their working capital 
(e.g. temporary deferrals of tax payments, 
reducing payment delays by the public sector). 
Moreover, Member States in general are paying 
attention to the design of structural reform 
measures with a view to optimising their impact 
and avoiding distortionary side-effects. For 
example, measures related to tax and benefits 
systems are often targeted at the lower end of the 
wage scale, which is likely to maximise their 
short-term impact on demand and is compatible 
with ensuring appropriate incentives to work 
over the longer term. There is no apparent 
indication of rolling back past reform measures 
or repeating previous policy errors, such as 
widening access to early retirement schemes.
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Special report 
II. Competitiveness developments within the euro area  
This special report provides a comprehensive review and assessment of competitiveness developments in the euro area since the 
launch of the euro in 1999. Over that period, the euro area has experienced significant divergence in the external economic 
performance of its individual Member States. This trend has been particularly conspicuous for competitive positions as 
measured by real effective exchange rate indicators. Some Member States have seen significant falls in their domestic prices vis-
à-vis the rest of the euro area while others have registered sharp rises. The diverging trend has also been visible in a steady 
widening of the differences in Member States' current account positions. The dispersion of current account balances within the 
euro area has increased steadily since the mid-1990s and is now at an all-time high.  
The divergence in competitiveness and current accounts can be ascribed to a range of factors. Some of them reflect the normal 
functioning of the euro-area economy. For example, changes in price competitiveness partly reflect cross-border convergence in 
the price level of tradable goods, Balassa-Samuleson effects and a healthy response to cyclical differences between Member 
States. Similarly, the euro has facilitated the divergence in current accounts by giving euro-area catching-up economies better 
access to international capital markets and allowing them to run larger trade deficits than in the rest of the OECD.  
However, this divergence trend also has less benign causes which warrant close monitoring. Differences in price competitiveness 
have been partly driven by an inappropriate response of wages to country-specific shocks in some Member States. As for 
current accounts, the divergence trend also reflects the build-up of domestic imbalances in some Member States. These 
imbalances, which are mostly linked to excessive domestic demand pressures, include high private sector and external debt, a 
surge in house prices and increased vulnerability to abrupt changes in financial market conditions. Furthermore, although 
catching-up economies in the euro area have benefited from large capital inflows, foreign capital has not always been channelled 
to the most productive uses. Finally, in some Member States, the deterioration of current account positions can in part be 
traced back to substantial losses in non-price competitiveness.  
Adjusting to these external imbalances will not only involve cuts in production costs and prices in the export sector, it will also 
imply changes in the domestic part of the economy concerned. It particular, there will be a need for a reallocation of demand 
and productive resources between the sheltered sector and the export sector and for changes in relative prices between these two 
sectors. The speed and the economic cost of the adjustment will therefore depend both on the degree of price and wage flexibility 
and on the ease with which resources can be reallocated across sectors in the countries considered.  
The ongoing financial turmoil seems to be speeding up adjustment to external imbalances within the euro area but it is only 
doing so partially and at a high cost. According to the most recent forecasts, some moderate convergence in current accounts 
should take place in 2009-10 as the financial turmoil forces the correction of some of the domestic imbalances that underlie 
external imbalances. However, the convergence in current accounts is taking place with only limited rebalancing in price 
competitiveness and will therefore come at a high cost in terms of underutilisation of labour and capital. 
 
This special report reviews and analyses 
divergences in competitiveness among euro-area 
Member States since the launch of the euro. The 
economic literature does not provide a single and 
commonly-agreed definition of competitiveness. 
The concept sometimes relates to a country's 
capacity to attract foreign investment or to its 
long-term growth performance and its 
technological potential. In this report, 
competitiveness should be understood in a more 
traditional macroeconomic sense and in close 
connection with a country's external performance 
and its capacity to sell its output on the world 
market. The report therefore reviews 
developments in Member States' price and cost 
competitiveness together with changes in their 
current account positions, net foreign asset 
positions and export market shares.  
The European Commission's extensive review of 
the first 10 years of the euro, published last year,4 
showed that there is a need to broaden 
surveillance in Economic and Monetary Union 
beyond budgetary issues in order to address 
macroeconomic imbalances, including external 
4  See European Commission – DG ECFIN (2008), 
'EMU@10: Successes and challenges after 10 years of 
Economic and Monetary Union', European 
Economy 2/2008. 
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imbalances at an early stage. Due to spill-over 
effects and the growing interdependence of euro-
area economies, macroeconomic imbalances 
within a Member State are a concern not just for 
the country in question but also for the euro area 
as a whole. There is therefore a need to monitor 
divergences in competitiveness and current 
accounts within the euro area in order to assess 
the extent to which they reflect the build-up of 
underlying imbalances which could prove to be 
costly to resolve both for the countries 
concerned and for the rest of the euro area.  
The report is structured as follows. Section 1 
presents key stylised facts of Member States' 
external performance since the launch of the 
euro. Section 2 reviews the causes of observed 
divergence in competitiveness and current 
accounts within the euro area. Section 3 discusses 
differences between harmful and benign 
developments in external performance in order 
to identify scope for policy intervention. 
Section 4 provides a quantitative assessment of 
necessary price adjustments within the euro area. 
Section 5 examines the impact of the financial 
turmoil on external adjustment in the euro area 
and Section 6 concludes. 
1.  Rising divergence of Member States' 
external performance  
Steady divergence in price competitiveness... 
Since the launch of the euro, the euro area has 
experienced significant divergences in its 
Member States' price and cost competitiveness as 
measured by real effective exchange rates 
(REER). This is true both for indicators of intra-
area REER - for which a Member State's 
competitiveness is assessed relative to its euro-
area trading partners - and for indicators of total 
REER - for which the reference group of trading 
partners is larger than the euro area (Graph 15).5  
The current level of divergence in 
competitiveness does not appear extremely large 
by historical standards but its persistence does. 
Based on standard measures of dispersion, 
5  REER indicators compiled by the European Commission 
are available for groups of 26, 35 and 40 trading partners.  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db
_indicators8642_en.htm. 
episodes of higher divergence in REER were 
observed before the launch of the euro, 
particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, 
these episodes were generally associated with 
high inflation and followed by nominal exchange 
rate realignment. Since the launch of the euro, 
changes in intra-area competitive positions have 
tended to be slower, but steady and increasingly 
persistent. As shown in Graph 16, the average 
autocorrelation coefficient of the REER – i.e. the 
extent to which the REER is determined by its 
past values – reached a peak in 2007 and has 
remained historically high since. 
Graph 15: Changes in REER (intra and total), euro-area 
Member States (in % - 1998 to 2008) 
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(1) REER (GDP deflator) against other EA countries (EA 16). 
(2) REER (GDP deflator) against other industrial countries (35). 
(3) Belgium + Luxembourg. 
(4) SK is off scale. True rise in REER is 68% (intra), 61% (IC35).  
Source: Commission services. 
Based on intra-area measures of the REER, three 
groups of countries can be distinguished.  
• Some Member States have improved their 
price competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of 
the euro area since 1999 (mostly DE, but 
also FI, AT and FR).  
• Others have maintained their competitive 
position at a broadly stable level compared 
with the euro-area average or incurred 
limited competitiveness losses (BE, SI, IT).  
• The remaining Member States have 
experienced a more substantial deterioration 
in their price competitiveness, with 
particularly sharp losses in four countries 
(IE, EL, ES and SK).  
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Graph 16: Average persistence of the intra-area REER, 
euro-area Member States (1) 
(in % –  8-year rolling window – 1982Q1-2008Q3) 
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(1) Based on EA 12 data. Persistence measured by the average first-
order autocorrelation of countries' REER based on GDP deflator.  
Source: Commission services. 
The competitiveness ranking remains broadly 
similar if, instead of intra-euro-area REER 
measures, it is based on measures that also 
encompass price and exchange rate 
developments outside the euro area. However, 
reflecting different currency exposure outside the 
euro area, a few Member States, such as Ireland 
and Malta, show significantly stronger real 
appreciation when non-euro-area trading 
partners are also considered.  
Graph 17: Changes in the intra-area REER (broad and 
narrow measures), euro-area Member States (1) 
(in % –  1998 to 2008) 
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(1) REER against other euro-area Member States (EA 16). 
(2) Belgium + Luxembourg..  
(3) SK is off scale. True rise in REER is 68% (GDP deflator), 48% 
(export deflator).  
 Source: Commission services. 
On the whole, the country grouping also holds 
for a range of broad measures of the REER, 
i.e. measures based on indices of costs or prices 
that cover the entire economy, such as unit 
labour costs or GDP deflators. However, it 
differs significantly for narrow measures of the 
REER, i.e. those based on prices in specific 
segments of the economy, such as export prices 
or manufacturing prices. For example, some 
Member States post a much better 
competitiveness performance with the export-
based REER than with the broad measures (IE, 
FR, SK, FI) while the opposites holds true for 
other Member States (BE, IT, MT) (Graph 17). 
The differences between broad and narrow 
measures reflect sharp movements in relative 
prices within the countries concerned and in 
particular changes in the relative prices of 
tradable and non-tradable goods and services.  
... coupled with losses in export market 
shares…  
Divergence in price and cost competitiveness has 
gone hand in hand with divergence in export 
performance. Some Member States have 
benefited from a surge in exports of goods and 
services over the past ten years, with annual 
growth averaging 7-8% or more (DE, IE, LU, SI, 
SK). In contrast, other Member States have 
posted a rather dismal export performance, with 
average annual growth in the 2-4% range (BE, 
FR, IT, CY, MT, PT) (Graph 18). 
To some degree, this disparity reflects differences 
in geographical specialisation, with some 
Member States being better positioned in 
traditionally fast growing export destinations 
such as Eastern Asia or Eastern Europe. 
Geographical specialisation, however, can only 
explain country differences in annual export 
growth of up to 1 or 2 percentage points. The 
heterogeneity is therefore mostly attributable to 
differences in market share developments. There 
has been indeed a very strong cross-country 
correlation between gains in export market 
shares and export growth over the past decade 
(Graph 19). Some countries have lost 
considerable market shares and posted sluggish 
export growth over the past decade (BE, FR, IT, 
MT, PT) while others have been much more 
successful (DE, IE, SI, SK) on both counts.  
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Graph 18: Exports of goods and services, euro-area 
Member States (average annual growth in % – 1999-2008) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 19: Exports market shares and export growth, 
euro-area Member States  
(average annual growth in % – 1999-2008) 
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(1) The export market share variable is an index calculated by 
comparing exports from the country considered to import demand 
in its main trading partners.  
Source: Commission services. 
Disparity in trade performance has been 
compounded by significant differences in non-
price competitiveness. Non-price 
competitiveness is not a simple concept lending 
itself to easy measurement. From the broad 
macroeconomic perspective adopted here, it can 
be viewed as the sum of all factors other than 
prices and costs that impact on trade 
performance (e.g. product quality, the efficiency 
of sales networks, industry specialisation, etc.).  
One way of getting a sense of the relative 
importance of price and non-price 
competitiveness is to look at apparent price 
elasticities of export demand. A low elasticity can 
be interpreted as evidence of strong non-price 
competitiveness. Graph 20 relates export market 
shares to the real effective exchange rate of euro-
area countries over the period 2003-2007. The 
graph shows a significant correlation between the 
two variables, suggesting that differences in price 
competitiveness go a long way in explaining 
differences in export performance within the 
euro area. However, the chart also includes clear 
outliers. Some Member States have clearly 
benefited from strong non-price competitiveness 
over the past decade (DE, SI, SK) while the 
opposite holds true for others (FR, IT). In all 
these Member States, factors other than costs 
and prices seem to have been instrumental in 
driving export performance in recent years. 
Graph 20: Export market shares and intra-REER, euro-
area Member States  
(average annual growth in % – 1999-2008) (1) 
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(1) The export market share variable is an index calculated by 
comparing exports from the country considered to import demand 
in its main trading partners.  
(2) R-squared and correlation line are for the EA excl. SK. 
Source: Commission services. 
… and large differences in current accounts 
and external asset positions 
Divergence in price and cost competitiveness has 
also been associated with a steady widening of 
current account differences within the euro area. 
The dispersion of current account positions 
across euro-area Member States has increased 
continuously since the mid-1990s and is now at 
an all-time high (Graph 21).  
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Some Member States now post large surpluses 
(DE, LU, AT, NL, FI) while others post large or 
very large deficits (primarily EL, ES, PT and CY 
but also IE, MT, SI, SK) (Graph 22). These 
positions have mostly built up since the launch 
of the euro, although some countries entered 
Stage 3 of EMU with an already sizeable deficit 
(EL and, above all, PT). A few countries have 
experienced significant drops in their current 
account in recent years although their balance 
remains in surplus or in comparatively moderate 
deficit (FR, IT and BE).   
Graph 21: Dispersion of current account positions, 
euro-area Member States (1)  
(standard deviation in % – 1970-2008) 
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(1) Dispersion is measured by the standard deviation of the balance 
of current transaction of individual Member States (in % of GDP). 
(2) EA excluding CY, LU, MT, SI and SK. 
Source: Commission services. 
Increasing current account deficits is not a purely 
euro-area trend and has been observed in a 
number of advanced economies over the past 
decade. However, there appears to be a euro-area 
dimension to this phenomenon: although current 
account deficits have also climbed substantially in 
the US, Australia and New Zealand, these have 
been well below the levels reached in Greece, 
Spain and Portugal.  
In addition to a historically high level of 
dispersion of current account positions in the 
euro area, the divergence in current accounts 
observed in recent years has also been 
remarkable in terms of its persistence. While 
large surpluses or deficits were occasionally 
registered in the 1970s and 1980s, they tended to 
be rather brief.  
Graph 22: Current account positions, euro-area 
Member States (in % of GDP – 1999 to 2008) (1) 
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(1) Net lending and borrowing from national accounts for all 
Member States except LU (bal. of current transactions). 
Source: Commission services. 
The counterpart to the accumulation of large 
current account deficits in some Member States 
has been the build-up of large negative net 
foreign asset positions (NFA) (Graph 23). In 
2007, Spain, Portugal and Greece posted net 
external liabilities ranging between 80 and 100% 
of GDP, levels which may be considered as high 
relative to those reached in other indebted 
OECD countries. Slovenia and Slovakia have 
also registered a rapid fall in their NFA in recent 
years, although their external liabilities still 
remain well below those recorded in Spain, 
Portugal and Greece. A few euro-area countries 
also enjoy comfortable positive NFAs (BE, DE 
and NL), but the orders of magnitude involved 
(15 to 30% of GDP) are much lower than in the 
case of countries with large external liabilities. 
Graph 23: Net foreign asset positions, euro-area 
Member States (1) (in % of GDP – 1995-2007) 
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(1) 2006 data for SK.  Source: Commission services. 
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2. Sources of increasing divergence in 
external performance 
This section discusses successively the possible 
sources of increasing divergence in the real 
effective exchange rates and the current accounts 
in the euro area.  
Evidence of Balassa-Samuelson effects is 
mixed 
Economic theory proposes a large range of 
possible drivers of the real effective exchange 
rate. The analysis presented here discusses the 
three 'usual suspects', namely the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, convergence in price levels and 
cross-country differences in the business cycle. It 
shows that differences in competitiveness 
developments across euro-area Member States in 
recent years can only partly be explained by these 
three factors. 
Graph 24: Productivity and inflation – tradable vs. 
non-tradable sector, euro-area Member States  
(1998-2005) (1) 
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 (1) Relative inflation refers to average inflation in the tradable 
sector divided by average inflation in the non-tradable sector. A 
value of 1 indicates equal average inflation rates during 1998-2005. 
Relative productivity growth is constructed in a similar way. 
Source: EU KLEMS, Commission services. 
The Balassa-Samuelson (BS) hypothesis predicts 
that price levels will increase when relative 
productivity rises in the tradable sector. If prices 
in the tradable sector are fixed because 
purchasing power parity holds and if wages 
equalise across sectors, then wages will increase 
both in the sector with productivity gains 
(tradable sector) and in the sector without 
productivity gains (non-tradable sector). As a 
consequence, the cost of producing non-
tradables will rise and thereby the general price 
level will increase.  
However, there is only weak evidence in the euro 
area that relative productivity increases have been 
a major determinant of relative inflation rates 
across sectors and therefore of overall inflation 
and real effective exchange rates. As shown in 
Graph 24, the link between relative inflation (in 
the tradable vs non-tradable sector) and relative 
productivity (in the tradable vs non-tradable 
sector) is weak. The correlation in the chart is 
negative as the BS hypothesis would predict but 
turns positive when Finland, a clear outlier, is 
omitted.  Furthermore, the euro-area economies 
that have experienced rapid REER appreciation 
in recent years appear to have had relatively low 
productivity growth rates in the tradable sector.  
To gain a better understanding of why the BS 
effect is weak in the euro area, it is necessary to 
investigate its central underlying assumptions. 
Graph 25 shows wide variance of sectoral wage 
growth in most countries (without a clear 
pattern). This contradicts the wage equalisation 
hypothesis, which is a central assumption 
underlying the BS effect.  
Graph 25: Wage growth – tradable vs. non-tradable 
sector, euro-area Member States (1998-2005) (1) 
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(1) Average wage growth rate in the tradable sector divided by 
average wage growth in the non-tradable sector during 1998-2005. 
A value of 1 indicates equal growth while a value larger than 1 
shows higher wage growth in the tradable sector.   
Source: EU KLEMS, Commission services. 
Graph 26 shows another factor hampering the 
BS effect, namely differences in profit margin 
changes across sectors and countries. The graph 
shows a relatively loose connection between 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area I/2009 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
relative unit labour costs (again in the tradable vs 
non-tradable sector) and relative inflation rates. 
In line with the BS effect, the graph indicates 
that countries in general have lower growth in 
unit labour costs in the tradable sector. However, 
the graph does not reveal any systematic link 
between relative unit labour costs and relative 
inflation, indicating that profit margin dynamics 
are quite different in the tradable and non-
tradable sectors. These differences in margin 
behaviour have further loosened the link 
between relative productivity and inflation or real 
exchange rates.  
Graph 26: Unit labour costs and inflation – tradable 
vs. non-tradable sector, euro-area Member States 
(1998-2005) (1) 
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(1) Relative inflation refers to average inflation in the tradable sector 
divided by average inflation in the non-tradable sector. A value of 1 
indicates equal average inflation rates during 1998-2005. Relative 
unit labour costs growth are constructed in a similar way. 
Source: EU KLEMS, Commission services. 
Overall, the analysis shows that there is only 
mixed evidence in favour of the BS effect in the 
euro area. Relative productivity differentials have 
little explanatory power for REER developments 
in the euro area. This can be explained by several 
factors, including limited wage equalisation and 
large differences in margin behaviour across 
sectors  
Price convergence in the euro area  
Prices have converged in the euro area over the 
past decade. Countries with comparatively low 
price levels in 1999 have seen larger average price 
increases than countries with price levels close to 
the euro-area average. The convergence in prices 
has mostly occurred in the tradable sector. As 
Graph 26 shows, the price dispersion across 
countries has fallen in the goods sector, while in 
the less tradable services sector the price 
dispersion has not changed substantially. 
Increasing market integration in the euro area 
could be the central factor driving the observed 
tradable price convergence. Overall, however, the 
extent of price convergence has remained rather 
limited and can only explain a fraction of 
observed REER developments. In those 
Member States where it was the most 
pronounced, convergence in tradable prices can 
only explain a loss in price competitiveness of a 
couple of percentage points over the entire past 
decade.  
Graph 27: Convergence in the price levels of goods and 
services, euro area 
(in % – 1999-07) (1) 
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(1) Standard deviation of price levels of euro-area countries 
compared to the euro-area average.  
Source: Commission services.  
Divergence in REER partly reflects the 
response of labour costs to business cycle 
developments... 
Divergence in competitiveness can be traced 
back to differences in labour cost developments 
across euro-area Member States. Over the past 
decade, annual average nominal unit labour cost 
growth has ranged from around zero in Germany 
to 2.5% or more in some Member States (IE, 
EL, ES, IT, CY, PT, SI) (Graph 28). This has 
translated into wide divergence of ULC-based 
REERs, with Germany's REER depreciating by 
about 15% while other Member States 
appreciated by 10 to 15%.  
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Differences in competitiveness developments 
partly respond to differences in cyclical 
conditions. In the face of a positive asymmetric 
demand shock, unit labour costs in the country 
affected by the shock should increase faster than 
in the rest of the euro area. The increase in ULC 
implies competitiveness adjustment. This is the 
so-called competitiveness channel of EMU.  
Graph 28: Compensation per employee, labour 
productivity and nominal unit labour costs (1999-2008) 
(average annual changes in %) 
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Source: Commission services. 
In line with the competitiveness channel, a 
positive relation between the cyclical position 
and the REER can be observed within the euro 
area for some periods of time as, for instance, is 
the case in the previous downturn (Graph 29) 
Graph 29: Unit labour costs and relative output gap, 
euro-area Member States  
(1999-2003 - period averages in %) (1) 
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(1) All variables are expressed in relative terms, i.e. they are 
normalised with respect to the weighted average of the remaining 
euro-area countries.  
 Source: Commission services.  
…but the business cycle cannot explain all of 
the divergence in labour costs 
However, a comparison of productivity and wage 
developments for different sub-periods of EMU 
also shows certain limits to how the 
competitiveness channel works. This is the case, 
for example, when looking at the 1999-03 and 
2004-08 periods, which correspond broadly to 
the previous cyclical downturn and upturn:6 
• The decline in unit labour costs in Germany 
which prevailed in 1999-03 continued its 
downward path during the 2004-08 period, 
due to persistent wage moderation in spite 
of an improvement in the country's cyclical 
position relative to the rest of the euro area.  
• The comparatively outstanding growth 
performance in Ireland during 1999-2003 
was only partially reflected in unit labour 
costs, as the country witnessed a structural 
positive shock in productivity. The 
vanishing of the advantage in productivity 
growth in 2004-08 resulted in a sizeable 
increase in relative unit labour costs and is 
unrelated to the country's almost neutral 
cyclical position.  
• Greece experienced marked increases in 
labour productivity in the early years of 
EMU but not thereafter. Unchanged wage 
behaviour meant sizeable increases in unit 
labour costs over 2003-2007.  
More generally, movements in unit labour costs 
over the longer term relative to the remaining 
euro-area Member States cannot be explained by 
asymmetric cyclical positions. Cyclical effects are, 
in most cases, broadly neutral over relatively long 
periods of time. Over 1999-2008, Member State 
differences in competitive positions have 
widened considerably despite minimal cyclical 
differences over the period as a whole.  
 
                                                     
6  For an extensive discussion of labour cost developments 
and their relation with competitiveness, see European 
Commission - DG ECFIN (2008), 'Labour market and 
wage developments in 2007', European 
Economy 5|2008, pp.103-109.  
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Current account divergence can be traced 
back to a range of factors 
The balance of goods and services is the largest 
component of the current account and, 
therefore, explains most of the fluctuations and 
country differences in the current account (see 
Table 3). However, other components have, to a 
lesser degree, also contributed to the divergence 
of current accounts in recent years. In particular, 
there have been significant changes in the 
balances of primary income (mostly reflecting 
changes in net foreign asset positions) and in the 
balances of transfers (mostly current but also in 
capital). The latter are probably related to 
changes in flows of EU funds but may also 
reflect changes in migration flows. 
The current account reflects aggregate savings 
and investment decisions of firms, households 
and the government in the economy. To the 
extent that the economy is saving (dissaving) as a 
whole, it will exhibit a current account surplus 
(deficit). Empirical analyses of the current 
account generally attempt to capture the 
determinants of the underlying savings and 
investment decisions. Central determinants 
identified in the economic literature include 
demographic factors, fiscal policy, the state of 
economic development and the business cycle.  
Domestic demand is an important driver of 
the current account… 
According to conventional wisdom, external 
factors such as price competitiveness are seen as 
major drivers of current accounts. However, a 
large part of the divergence in the current 
account in the euro area since the late 1990s can 
be traced back to domestic demand. There have 
been considerable and persistent differences in 
domestic demand across Member States since the 
launch of the euro. Stronger relative demand 
pressure in a Member State will tend to fuel 
import demand and depress the current account.  
As shown in Graph 30, growth in domestic 
demand over the past decade is indeed closely 
correlated with changes in current account 
positions. The link between domestic demand 
and the current account is also backed by the 
regression analysis presented in Box 3, which 
Table 3: Current account composition  
(in % of GDP) 
 Balance of 
goods and 
services 
Net primary 
income 
Net current 
transfers 
Current 
transactions 
Capital 
transactions 
Net borrowing 
 (1) (2) (3) (1)+(2)+(3)=(4) (5) (4)+(5)=(6) 
Ch.  
98-2008 
Ch.  
98-2008 
Ch. 
98-2008 
Ch.  
98-2008 
Ch.  
98-2008 
Ch.  
98-2008  
2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 
BE -0.2 -4.6 0.6 -1.2 -1.1 0.0 -0.7 -5.8 -0.3 -0.2 -1.0 -6.0 
DE 6.6 5.2 1.7 2.7 -1.2 -0.2 7.1 7.8 0.0 0.0 7.1 7.8 
IE 11.9 0.0 -16.4 -5.0 -1.2 -1.5 -5.7 -6.6 0.0 -1.1 -5.7 -7.6 
EL -9.6 -2.0 -3.1 -5.6 -0.7 -2.6 -13.4 -10.1 1.7 -0.2 -11.7 -10.4 
ES -6.0 -5.8 -2.5 -1.6 -0.9 -1.0 -9.4 -8.3 0.4 -0.6 -9.0 -9.0 
FR -2.8 -5.4 0.5 -0.3 -1.5 -0.5 -3.8 -6.1 0.0 -0.1 -3.8 -6.2 
IT -0.3 -3.3 -1.0 -0.3 -1.0 -0.5 -2.2 -4.2 0.0 -0.2 -2.2 -4.4 
CY -7.3 -6.4 -5.5 -11.6 -0.6 10.9 -13.4 -7.1 0.2 0.2 -13.2 -6.9 
LU 30.4 13.9 -21.2 -13.2 -1.2 -1.9 8.0 -1.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MT -3.8 1.7 -2.4 -0.7 -0.3 -1.4 -6.5 -0.5 1.0 0.2 -5.5 -0.3 
NL 7.9 3.2 1.9 2.9 -1.3 -0.2 8.4 5.9 -0.7 -0.5 7.7 5.5 
AT 5.7 5.2 -1.9 -0.5 -0.7 0.0 3.1 4.7 0.0 0.2 3.2 4.8 
PT -8.7 0.2 -4.4 -3.0 1.4 -1.7 -11.8 -4.5 1.6 -0.9 -10.2 -5.4 
SI -2.7 -1.2 -2.5 -2.7 -0.8 -1.0 -6.0 -4.9 0.3 0.3 -5.7 -4.6 
SK -1.0 9.8 -3.8 -3.9 -1.2 -2.5 -6.0 3.4 0.6 0.7 -5.4 4.1 
FI 4.1 -4.7 1.0 3.3 -0.9 -0.2 4.2 -1.6 1.0 0.9 5.2 -0.6 
Source: Commission services. 
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attempts to quantify the role of a range of 
determinants of the trade balance. The analysis 
suggests that changes in domestic demand could 
account for as much as 40-50% of the 
differences in current accounts observed in the 
euro area since the launch of the euro.  
Graph 30: Domestic demand and the current account, 
euro-area Member States 
 (1998-2008) 
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Source: Commission services. 
…while export performance plays a relatively 
small role  
External factors such as differences in export 
price competitiveness, external demand or oil 
exposure also play a role in explaining the 
divergence of current accounts, but it appears to 
be of secondary importance compared with 
domestic demand factors. Export growth is only 
loosely correlated with changes in the current 
account (Graph 31), and differences in export 
performance can only explain a fraction of cross-
country differences in current accounts. 
Furthermore, in some Member States, 
developments in current accounts and export 
performance have shown quite different time 
patterns. In Spain and Greece, in particular, the 
deterioration in current accounts in the late 
1990s preceded – rather than followed – a 
deterioration in exports performance by several 
years. This suggests a pattern where strong 
domestic demand first drives the current account 
down and is associated with a progressive 
weakening of competitiveness, which later 
weighs on export performance. Other countries 
(BE, FR and IT), however, have experienced a 
simultaneous deterioration in their export 
performance and their current account. 
Graph 31: Exports and the current account, euro-area 
Member States   
(1998-2008) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Similarly, differences in dependence on oil 
imports can only account for a fraction of the 
divergence in current accounts (Graph 32). Net  
imports of oil have increased in all euro-area 
Member States since 1999, accounting for a drop 
in the trade balance of around 1-1.5 % of GDP. 
EL, CY, MT and LU have seen comparatively 
stronger rises in imports of oil but, even in these 
countries, the associated drop in the trade 
balance has not exceeded 3% of GDP (except 
for CY). 
 
Graph 32: Increase in net import of oil, change in % of 
GDP, euro-area Member States  
(1999-2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
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Fiscal policies and demographics are not the 
major drivers of current account divergence 
in the euro area 
Fiscal policy can dampen or aggravate 
fluctuations in private sector demand and thereby 
mitigate or compound the impact on the current 
account. Available empirical evidence – including 
the regression results reported in Box 3 – 
suggests that government deficits are a 
meaningful determinant of current account 
positions, although their impact is partly offset 
by Ricardian equivalence effects (i.e. offsetting 
private sector savings).  
Decomposing the current account into its 
underlying household, corporate and government 
savings and investment balances for the 1999-
2008 period shows that fiscal policy helped to 
contain demand pressures from the private 
sector in several catching-up countries (ES, CY, 
MT, SI), thereby helping to contain the 
deterioration of the current accounts in those 
Member States.  
In contrast, in a few other catching-up 
economies, fiscal policy did little to offset 
demand fluctuations or even compounded them 
(EL, PT). In Member States with large current 
account surpluses (DE, NL, FI), changes in the 
government saving/investment balance were 
either limited or of the same sign as changes in 
private sector surpluses and therefore did little to 
reduce external surpluses.  
Overall, changes in public saving/investment 
balances in most Member States have remained 
relatively small compared with changes in the 
current account in recent years. Fiscal policy has 
therefore not been the main driver of the 
divergence in current account in the euro area 
over the past decade. Nevertheless, it has proved 
to be an important tool for cooling off demand 
pressures in some catching-up economies, 
although it could have been used even more in 
that direction than has actually been the case. 
In economies where the share of the population 
that does not work – because it is either too 
young or too old – is rising, private savings tend 
to fall, driving current accounts positions 
downwards. Accordingly, current account 
positions should be negatively correlated with the 
so-called dependency ratio. This is indeed the 
case in the regression results presented in Box 3. 
They suggest that when the ratio of non-
working-age population to working-age 
population increases by 10 pp, the current 
account worsens by 1.4% of GDP. However, 
changes in the dependency ratios of euro-area 
countries since the late 1990s have remained 
small and are unlikely to account for a significant 
part of the current account dynamics over that 
period. In the countries which registered the 
largest increase in the dependency ratio over 
1999-06 (DE, IT), the fall in the current account 
is estimated at less than 1%. 
The link between current accounts and 
catching-up processes is generally weak in 
broad sets of countries… 
In theory, catching-up economies should run 
current account deficits for two reasons: high 
profitability of investment projects and 
consumption smoothing. On the one hand, low 
capital-to-labour ratios imply that the marginal 
return on capital is high.7 This should make 
investment in low income countries relatively 
attractive, leading to significant inflows of capital 
and current account deficits in these countries. In 
addition, as households in the economy expect 
their future income to be higher than today's, 
they will want to shift consumption to the 
present.8 As a result, consumption and 
investment will have a tendency to exceed 
output, resulting in a current account deficit.  
 
7  Solow, R. (1956), 'A contribution to the Theory of 
Economic Growth', Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 70, 
pp. 65-94. 
8  According to the standard intertemporal approach to the 
current account, consumption is smoothed over time by 
lending and borrowing abroad. Obstfeld, M. and K. 
Rogoff (1994), 'The intertemporal approach to the 
current account', Chapter 34 in Handbook of International 
Economics, 1995, vol. 3, pp 1731-1799, Elsevier.  
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 29 - 
 
Box 3: Determinants of trade balance  
The table below reports the results of a panel analysis, along the lines of Chin and Prasad (2003), of the determinants 
of the balance of goods and services (trade balance) in OECD countries.  
The base model (column A) tests the impact of the dependency ratio, a measure of the business cycle, the budget 
balance and income per capita.  
• Societies with a higher number of dependents tend to run lower external balances.  
• The balance of goods and services correlates positively with the government's budget balance, indicating the 
presence of non-Ricardian effects. The empirical estimate might be on the low side of the true effect since the 
regression is a reduced form, which does not control for endogeneity problems. However, in the literature there 
is no general consensus on the size of the fiscal multiplier. It is often found to be between 0.5 and 1 (see, for 
example, Perotti (2005), Tenhofen and Wolff (2007) and Ramey (2006)).  
• Regarding relative per capita income, it is significantly connected to the goods and services balance for the 
entire sample. An increase in relative per capita GDP of 1 pp will entail an improvement in the trade balance of 
0.15% of GDP.  
In regression B, we find strong evidence that, in the euro area, relatively rich countries tend to have more 
pronounced surpluses than outside the euro area, the effect increases to 0.28 (almost twice as large). This suggests 
that the euro could indeed have facilitated trade balance deficits for catching-up economies that previously would 
not have been able to run deficits to the same extent. In the euro area, net financial flows therefore run more 
strongly 'downhill', i.e. from rich to poor countries.  
Panel estimates of the determinants of trade balance (as a share of GDP) in OECD countries, 1973-2007 
A B C D  
-13.59*** -11.12*** -18.06*** -17.43***Dependency ratio 
 -4.8 -3.95 -5.68 -7.29 
0.23*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.01 Budget balance as a share of GDP 
 6.37 5.35 5.31 0.35 
-47.60*** -47.06*** -50.76***  Business cycle 
 -14.22 -14.72 -15.52  
15.53*** 12.24* 12.15** 16.87***Relative GDP per capita (2) 
 8.3 6.73 6.96 7.52 
 15.66*** 17.22*** 8.17*** Relative GDP per capita (2) * EMU 
  7.67 8.46 4.85 
  -0.02*** 0.00 House price 
   -3.31 -0.81 
  -0.05** -0.03***House price * EMU 
   -3.99 -2.88 
   -0.32***Domestic Demand (1) 
    -17.85 
 -14.30*** -9.01*** -3.68* EMU 
  -6.87 -3.51 -1.75 
     
N 685 685 606 569 
r2 0.41 0.47 0.58 0.54 
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In regression C, we test the effects of house prices on the trade balance. The results suggest that house prices have 
an effect on the trade balance; the effect is larger in the euro area. An increase in house prices of 100% would lead to 
a deterioration of the trade balance of more than 7% of GDP in the euro area, while outside the euro area it would 
amount to 2%.  
 
In regression D, we control for relative domestic demand as an additional variable to capture longer demand cycles. 
While demand is an endogenous variable, which, from an econometric point of view, has to be interpreted with 
caution, it is nevertheless useful in capturing demand effects and separating them from supply effects. Relative 
demand is a quantitatively important determinant of the trade balance. An increase of 1% would lead to an increase 
in the trade deficit of 0.3% of GDP.  
While the general significance of house prices disappears when domestic demand is included, in the euro area house 
prices remain a significant determinant of the trade balance. One of the main reasons for the relevance of house 
prices in the euro area might therefore be on the supply side. It could relate to the internal shift of resources from 
the tradable sector to the non-tradable construction sector. In fact, when we control for construction investment 
relative to total investment (or relative to GDP) to capture a shift of resources to the construction sector, the house 
price variable is significantly weaker. Shifts in resources to the non-tradable construction sector therefore appear to 
be a major factor of trade balance deficits as they potentially reduce the supply of tradable products. Moreover, the 
effect of house prices on the trade balance also appears to go beyond the real interest effect, as the result remains 
significant when including the real interest rate. 
References: 
Chinn, M. and E. Prasad (2003), 'Medium-term determinants of current accounts in industrial and developing 
countries: An empirical exploration', Journal of International Economics, Vol. 59, pp. 47-76. 
Perotti, R. (2005) 'Estimating the effects of fiscal policy in OECD countries', Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco.  
Tenhofen, J. and G.B. Wolff (2007), 'Does anticipation of government spending matter? Evidence from an 
expectation augmented VAR', Deutsche Bundesbank discussion paper, No.14. 
 
Ramey, V. A. (2006), 'Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the Timing', mimeo.
…but it is stronger in advanced economies 
and sizeable in EMU 
While the theory of catching-up growth has 
found widespread support in the empirical 
literature, the catching-up process is generally not 
reflected in current accounts.9 Nevertheless, 
Box 3 provides some evidence that the link 
between current account deficits and catching up 
may be more in line with theory when advanced 
economies are considered separately. This could 
be evidence that more integrated financial 
markets are playing a role in facilitating 
convergence processes in these countries. 
                                                     
                                                     
9  Lucas formulated the famous 'Lucas paradox', showing 
that capital does not flow from rich to poor countries as 
the theory presented above would suggest. Lucas, R. 
(1990), 'Why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor 
countries?', American Economic Review, Vol.80, pp. 92–96. 
As shown in more detail in Box 3, euro-area 
countries with comparatively low GDP per capita 
typically have larger trade deficits. The order of 
magnitude involved is sizeable: according to the 
estimates, participation in EMU is associated 
with a 1.6% reduction in the current account for 
a country with a GDP per capita of 90% of the 
euro-area average. This comes on top of the 
1.2% reduction for countries outside the euro 
area. The estimate suggests that the euro has 
allowed catching-up Member States to tap 
international capital markets more successfully.10 
10  Two caveats are necessary, however. First, the regression 
framework presented in the box does not allow the euro 
effect to be disentangled from the possible lagged impact 
of financial market integration resulting from the 
Internal Market process. Second, the estimated euro 
effect is based on a relatively short period which does 
not cover a full economic cycle. It is therefore 
impossible to say to what extent the estimate reflects a 
sustainable effect or some form of overshooting linked 
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In particular, the introduction of the euro led to a 
strong decrease in risk premiums in euro-area 
countries that formerly exhibited a comparatively 
high exchange rate risk. In addition to the 
elimination of exchange rate risks, the single 
currency has also spurred financial integration 
and competition, further facilitating households' 
and corporations' access to finance and further 
easing credit constraints. In most catching-up 
Member States, the ensuing reduction in interest 
rates entailed an economic boom driven by 
buoyant domestic demand. Demand pressures 
led to the emergence of significant current 
account deficits alongside increased inflation 
pressures. 
In addition, the financial integration effect of the 
euro was reinforced by diverging inflation and 
real interest rates. Indeed, the booming 
economies of the euro area received further 
stimulus as their above-average inflation rate led 
to lower real interest rates in the face of virtually 
identical nominal interest rates across the euro 
area. The combination of further demand stimuli 
from falling real interest rates and the progressive 
appreciation of the real exchange rate fostered 
further increases in the current account deficit. 
Conversely, countries with below-average 
inflation rates, in particular Germany, faced 
relatively high real interest rates. High real 
interest rates reduced domestic demand and 
imports while gains in competitiveness enhanced 
the export performance, with both effects driving 
the current account upwards.11 
Housing markets have played a pivotal role 
in the divergence of current accounts within 
the euro area 
Euro-area countries have seen significant 
divergences in house prices (Graph 33). Based 
on ECB statistics, the residential property price 
indicator for the euro area as a whole has 
increased by 66% in nominal terms or 41% in 
 
to the fact that economic agents still need to come to 
grips with the full implications of the euro. 
11  It is important to note that the euro effect estimated in 
the box remains significant when real interest rates are 
introduced as a control variable, indicating that the 
results capture more than the effect of inflation 
differences on real interest rates. 
real terms since the introduction of the euro. In 
the most extreme cases, France and Spain, house 
prices have nearly doubled. At the other end of 
the spectrum, Germany's real house prices have 
fallen by more than 10%.  
Graph 33: Real house prices, euro-area Member States  
(change in % - 1999-2007) 
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Greek data cover 1999-2006. Luxembourg data give the increase 
over 1999-2005. Nominal house price data are deflated by GDP 
deflator. 
Source: ECB, Commission services. 
 
Graph 34: Changes in real house prices and current 
accounts, euro-area Member States (1999-2007) 
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Greek data cover 1999-2006. Luxembourg data give the increase 
over 1999-2005. Nominal house price data are deflated by GDP 
deflator. Source: ECB, Commission services. 
In the euro area, higher house prices have been 
associated with higher current account deficits 
(Graph 34). Interestingly, this link between 
housing and the external position appears to be 
much stronger in the euro area than in other 
advanced economies (Graph 35). The special role 
of house prices as a determinant of current 
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accounts in the euro area is also backed by the 
econometric evidence provided in Box 3. 
Graph 35: Changes in real house prices and current 
accounts, non-euro-area countries (1999-2007) 
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Source: OECD, Commission services. 
Several factors may explain the link between 
house prices and current accounts. 
First, house prices and real interest rates are 
strongly correlated. Housing markets have been 
an important transmission mechanism between 
real interest rates and domestic demand in the 
euro area (the so-called real interest rate channel). 
However, the fact that housing markets have 
acted as a major transmission mechanism raises 
the question of the relative weakness of 
alternative transmission mechanisms, such as 
corporate investment or equity prices. Why have 
Member States with low interest rates seen 
housing booms rather than corporate investment 
booms? Further work is needed here to relate 
observed current account developments to the 
structural characteristics of the housing sector or 
the productive sector. 
Second, the identified housing market effect goes 
beyond real interest rates. In the regressions 
presented in Box 3, the house price effect 
remains meaningful even when controlling for 
real interest rates, suggesting that the house price 
variable captures additional determinants of the 
current account which are not reflected in real 
interest rates. These could include financial 
deepening and better access to mortgages for 
credit-constrained households.  
Finally, the impact of house prices on the current 
account also seems to reflect supply-side effects. 
These are probably related to the shift of 
productive resources from high-productivity fast-
growing tradable sectors to the low-productivity 
housing sector. The regression results presented 
in Box 3 show that the effect of house prices in 
the euro area goes beyond increased domestic 
demand and is therefore probably related to 
supply factors.   
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3.  Distinguishing between 'benign' and 
'harmful' developments in 
competitiveness 
Indentifying underlying domestic 
imbalances is key for policy intervention 
Changes in competitiveness and current accounts 
are not bad per se. For example, current account 
deficits can facilitate income convergence 
processes by allowing comparatively low income 
countries to import the capital needed to finance 
growth. Similarly, temporary changes in relative 
REER positions in response to differences in 
Member States' cyclical positions may be an 
indication that the so-called competitiveness 
adjustment channel is operating effectively.  
Against this background, a major challenge is to 
distinguish between 'harmful' and 'benign' 
changes in external performance. The former 
require some form of policy intervention while 
adjustment to the latter should be left to market 
forces. Economic theory suggests that the 
distinction largely depends on the extent to 
which changes in external performance are 
driven by market dysfunction or policy mistakes. 
Blanchard (2007) discusses the issue with the 
help of a simple model based on a fully flexible 
and competitive economy. He shows that a 
temporary demand shock will be accompanied by 
a temporary current account deficit and 
successive phases of real exchange rate 
appreciation and depreciation. These swings in 
competitiveness can, however, be considered to 
be 'benign'. Scope for welfare improving policy 
action only exists if market distortions – e.g. 
price and wage rigidities – are introduced in the 
model.12 
Overall, it is therefore crucial from a policy 
perspective to assess the extent to which 
developments in competitiveness and external 
performance within the euro area can be related 
to policy mistakes, market failures or any form of 
domestic macroeconomic imbalance at Member 
State level.  
Looking at the past decade, and as discussed in 
the previous section, divergence in 
                                                     
12  Blanchard, O. (2007), 'Current account deficits in rich 
countries', NBER working paper, No. 12925. 
competitiveness can in part be traced back to 
benign factors such as Balassa-Samuelson effects, 
price convergence or cyclical differences. BS and 
price convergence effects can be considered to 
be largely neutral as regards export performance 
and the current account while competitiveness 
changes have, to some extent, helped to reduce 
cyclical differences within the euro area.13 In the 
same vein, the discussion in the previous section 
showed that current account dispersion within 
the euro area is partly a sign of increased 
financial market integration, with the euro acting 
as a catalyst.  
However, the analysis in the previous section 
also pointed to less 'benign' drivers of the 
divergence in external performance. In particular, 
it indicated that differences in cost 
competitiveness can in part be ascribed to 
inappropriate responses of wages to productivity 
shocks. Furthermore, as discussed below, losses 
in competitiveness and the accumulation of large 
current account deficits can, in a number of 
Member States, be related to a range of domestic 
macroeconomic imbalances that warrant close 
surveillance. These include sluggish productivity 
performance, the accumulation of high private 
sector debt and the emergence of housing 
bubbles.14  
13  Assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences, a rise in the real 
exchange rate driven by a BS effect will leave the current 
account unchanged. This will also be the case for price 
convergence in the non-tradable sector, to the extent that 
it is driven by BS effects. Price convergence in the 
tradable sector may also be considered to be 'benign', to 
the extent that it results from market integration or 
product quality upgrades.  
14  For space reasons, the discussion on domestic imbalances 
that underlie competitiveness problems has to remain 
relatively succinct. For a more in-depth analysis of key 
domestic issues in some Member States, see, for example:  
Buti, M. (ed) (2009), 'Italy in EMU – The challenges of 
adjustment and growth', Palgrave Macmillan.  
Cabrero, A., Maza, L. A. and J. Yaniz (2007), 'Spain's 
external deficit: how is it financed?', European 
Commission, DG ECFIN, Country Focus, No 7, June.  
Malzubris, J.(2008), ‘Ireland's housing market: bubble 
trouble', European Commission, DG ECFIN, Country 
Focus, No 9, September.  
Abreu, O. (2006), 'Portugal's boom and bust: lessons for 
euro newcomers', European Commission, DG ECFIN, 
Country Focus, No 16, December.  
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Disappointing productivity performance in 
some indebted and converging countries  
Countries running large current account deficits 
in the euro area typically have a GDP per capita 
below the euro-area average (Graph 36). In 
theory, their growth should therefore be driven 
by a catching-up process which should, in future, 
facilitate the repayment of accumulated external 
debt. In practice, only Greece, Slovenia and 
Slovakia have been on a clear convergence path 
since 1999. Spain's strong GDP growth 
performance has been largely matched by rapid 
population growth, leading to limited real 
convergence in GDP per capita. Convergence 
has also remained small in Cyprus and Malta 
whereas Portugal has seen its level of GDP per 
capita fall compared with the rest of the euro 
area.  
Graph 36: GDP per capita and the current account, 
euro-area Member States  
(2008)  
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Source: Commission services. 
Capital and productivity data provide further 
evidence of the limitations of some of the 
convergence processes in recent years. 
Investment and technical progress, as captured 
by total factor productivity (TFP), are the two 
main channels through which a convergence 
process impacts on growth. Graph 37 displays 
the contribution of capital accumulation and TFP 
to potential growth over the past 10 years. Only 
about half of the countries with GDP per capita 
below the euro-area average show the traditional 
convergence pattern of rapid capital 
accumulation and strong TFP growth (EL, SI, 
SK). For the other half, the TFP performance is 
weaker than in the euro area as a whole (ES, PT, 
CY and MT), offsetting slightly faster capital 
accumulation than in the euro area as a whole.  
Graph 37: Contribution of capital and TFP to potential 
growth, euro-area Member States  
(2008)  
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(1) Sum of the contribution of capital and trend TFP to potential 
growth. 
Source: Commission services. 
Capital inflows into converging countries 
were not always channelled to the most 
productive uses… 
Thanks to the euro and EU financial integration, 
converging economies in the euro area generally 
benefited from large capital inflows over the past 
decade. Nevertheless foreign capital was not 
always channelled to the most productive uses 
and therefore not always very conducive to 
growth. Most notably in Spain and Portugal, 
current account deficits were driven to a large 
extent by the household sector, either through 
lower household savings or higher housing 
investment. The record is more balanced in 
Greece where capital inflows were channelled 
both to households and to the corporate sector.  
While the association between current account 
deficits and household spending is not 
necessarily bad, the instrumental role played by 
household spending and, in particular, housing in 
the growth process of some euro-area 
converging countries is not without its pitfalls. 
Consumption obviously has no impact on 
production potential. In addition, although 
housing investment helps to raise the capital 
stock, it is unlikely to have positive spill-over 
effects on TFP and its contribution to the 
economy's long-term production potential is 
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therefore limited. Finally, a large shift in labour 
resources to a low productivity sector such as 
construction weighs negatively on overall 
productivity performance. 
… and sometimes contributed to surges in 
private sector debt and to housing bubbles 
In Member States with large current account 
deficits, the main counterpart to the build-up of 
negative net foreign asset positions has been 
soaring household and non-financial corporate 
sector debt. The household sector in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain significantly increased its 
financial liabilities over the past decade 
(Graph 38). In the non-financial corporate 
sector, debt increased in particular in Spain and 
Portugal (Graph 39). Overall, private sector debt 
now appears high relative to the euro-area 
average in Spain and Portugal while it remains 
close to the average in Greece.  
Graph 38: Household loans, euro-area Member States  
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(1) Data for 1998 and 2006. (2) Data for 2001 and 2007.  
Source: Commission services. 
The government sector played no role in the 
accumulation of external debt in ES but a more 
significant one in EL and PT.15  
In some Member States, capital inflows, by 
facilitating the rise in household debt, have 
contributed to the formation of housing bubbles. 
While it is notoriously difficult to assess the 
extent to which assets are priced correctly, house 
                                                     
15 Changes in the government deficit were relatively small 
over the past decade in EL and PT but still compounded 
somewhat the increase of the current account deficit. 
prices in several euro-area countries have 
increased during much of the past decade by 
more than can be readily justified by 
fundamentals. In several Member States price-
rent ratios are now well above the average levels 
in the 1970s and 1980s. While parts of the 
increase in prices in some countries can be 
explained by lower real interest rates and 
demographic trends, studies suggest that there 
have been excesses.16  
Graph 39: Non-financial corporation loans, euro-area 
Member States (% of GDP) 
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(1) Data for 1998 and 2006. (2) Data for 2001 and 2007. 
Source: Commission services. 
The combination of surging private-sector debt 
and likely house price overvaluation is an 
indication of possible overshooting in the level 
of private sector debt. There is therefore a risk 
that, in some Member States, large capital inflows 
in recent years have been associated with an 
excessive accumulation of debt. This would 
reflect over-optimistic private-sector expectations 
regarding the future capacity to service debt and 
the underlying strength of balance sheets. History 
suggests that periods of marked structural 
changes in the financial sector may be associated 
with spells of excessively optimistic expectations, 
as economic agents (including policymakers) 
need time to fully understand the implications of 
their changing environment.17 
                                                     
16 See, for example, IMF (2008), 'World Economic Outlook 
- Housing and the Business Cycle', April 2008, 
International Monetary Fund. 
17  This may have been the case in the UK and Nordic 
countries in the 1980s. See Debelle, G. (2004), 
‘Macroeconomic implications of rising household debt’, 
BIS Working Paper, No 153, June. 
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Graph 40: Ratio of house prices to rents, selected euro-
area Member States  
(1995Q1-2008Q1) 
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Source: OECD, Commission services' calculation. 
Large external liabilities increase exposure to 
financial shocks  
For the Member States concerned, the 
competitiveness problems and macroeconomic 
imbalances discussed in this special report also 
tend to aggravate the exposure to the current 
financial turmoil, for several reasons, including 
the central role played by banks in the 
transmission of capital inflows into converging 
countries, a rise in short-term financing and risks 
associated with high leverage.  
Graph 41: Increase in the size of the balance sheet of 
monetary and financial institutions 
(% of GDP, Jan. 1999 – Jan. 2009) 
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(Monetary and financial institutions, excluding the Eurosystem. 
Change since (1) Nov. 2005, (2) Jan. 2005, (3) Jan. 2004, (4) Jan. 
2006. 
Source: ECB, Commision services' calculation. 
In countries with large current account deficits, 
the banking sector has acted as an intermediary, 
turning inflows of capital into household and 
corporate debt.18 In contrast, shares have not 
contributed substantially to the expansion of 
balance sheets of non-financial corporations in 
these countries. Accordingly, the balance sheet 
size of banks has increased significantly in 
Member States running current account deficits, 
in particular in IE, ES, MT and PT (Graph 41). 
In other words, in Member States with large 
external liabilities, the exposure of the private 
sector to the banking sector is now generally 
much higher than at the end of the previous 
decade.  
A range of indicators also suggest that short-term 
financing has taken on an important role in the 
funding of a number of large current account 
deficits in the euro area:  
First, relatively short-term financing in the form 
of deposits from the rest of the world is visible in 
several countries. As Table 4 shows, Greece and 
Portugal have financed more than half of their 
increases in net external liabilities since 1998 by 
currency and deposits. In Spain, currency and 
deposits amounted to 25% of the increase in 
financing over the period. Increases in foreign 
deposits have also been particularly large in 
Ireland. While domestic deposits are usually 
regarded as a stable source of finance for banks, 
cross-border deposits are easy to withdraw and 
can be considered to be a more volatile source of 
finance.  
Second, while cross-border portfolio investments 
are mainly in long-term debt securities, the share 
of short-term securities has increased in recent 
years. Short-term debt securities represent a very 
small proportion of total cross-border debt but 
intra-euro-area cross-border investment in short-
term debt securities as a percentage of GDP has 
increased in Greece, Spain and notably in 
Portugal, from 1.3% of GDP in 2001 to 4.1% in 
2006 according to IMF statistics.   
                                                     
18 The financial data of national accounts unsurprisingly 
reveal that households have increased debt by taking up 
loans from the banking sector (EL, ES, PT). Non-
financial corporations have predominantly relied on bank 
loans to fund their liabilities in PT and most notably in 
ES. The analysis of national account data is however 
limited by the lack of complete balance sheet data in 
some Member States (CY, MT and to a lesser degree IE). 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 37 - 
 
Table 4: Financial account balance sheet - Net liabilities with the rest of the world  
(changes 1998-2007 as a share of GDP) (1) 
Balances: Total 
Securities 
other than 
shares 
Loans 
Shares and 
other 
equity 
Currency 
and 
Deposits 
Insurance 
technical 
reserves 
Other 
accounts 
receivable/
payable 
IE -5.2 19.2 -119.9 -20.1 75.8 19.0 20.7 
EL 70.0 18.5 -2.2 15.4 37.3 0.0 1.0 
ES 49.6 43.1 10.6 -14.8 10.4 -0.2 0.4 
FR 10 -2.3 -2.8 -11.5 24.7 0.1 1.9 
IT -0.9 14.9 -1.2 -15.6 2.4 -1.4 -0.1 
PT 62 16.3 9.9 3.9 33.2 0.2 -1.3 
SI 17.7 -14.8 14.5 -6.2 20.4 -0.3 4.1 
Cu
rr
en
t a
cc
ou
nt
 d
ef
ici
t c
ou
nt
rie
s 
SK 31.5 -7.8 -0.8 32.8 12.0 n.a. -4.7 
BE 4.8 -7.0 -54.7 34.3 17.1 -1.8 16.9 
DE -19.0 7.1 -3.2 -8.8 -17.2 3.9 -0.9 
NL -57.9 33.4 -26.3 -66.8 1.2 0.7 -0.1 
FI -44.3 -26.8 -6.0 -13.4 2.6 -0.2 -0.6 
Cu
rr
en
t a
cc
ou
nt
 
su
rp
lu
s c
ou
nt
rie
s 
AT -3.6 12.6 -8.8 -9.3 -1.3 -0.2 3.3 
(1) Data for Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg are not available; Netherlands and Slovakia are for 1998-2006, Slovenia and Ireland for 2001-2007.  
Source: Commission services 
Graph 42: Net FDI flows, euro-area Member States  
(average 2001-2007 in % of GDP) 
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(1) 2002-07 average for BE. (2) 2001 and 2004-07 average for EL. 
(3) LU omitted for scale reasons (LU FDI balance is -35% of GDP 
for 2001-07). 
Source: Commission services. 
Finally, foreign direct investment (FDI) – 
arguably the most long-term form of finance – 
has played only a limited role in the funding of 
current account deficits of some catching-up 
economies in recent years. Since 1999, net FDI 
inflows have been negative in Spain and Greece 
– averaging a substantial -2.2% annually in the 
case of the former – and have been only slightly 
positive in Portugal. They have, however, been 
significantly positive in other catching-up 
countries (SI, MT, CY and SK). 
In addition to the net financial position, the 
exposure of countries to financial shocks also 
depends on the absolute level of assets and 
liabilities. A country with a high ratio of assets or 
liabilities to GDP is more vulnerable to abrupt 
changes in financial market conditions than a 
country with a relatively low ratio – for two 
reasons. First, if creditors quickly withdraw 
funds, ensuing wealth and balance sheet effects 
will be larger than in low-ratio countries. Second, 
unless asset and liability types, for example 
regarding term structure and quality, match 
exactly, any change in credit conditions can result 
in increased payment obligations. As shown in 
Graph 43, gross exposure is particularly high in 
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mes in the case 
of Belgium and the Netherlands) 
Graph lities,  
Member States such as Ireland (and to a lesser 
degree Belgium), with assets and liabilities with 
respect to the rest of the world more than 13 
times the annual GDP (5 and 6 ti
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(1) 2006 data for NL and SK. (2) EA excluding CY, LU, MT. 
Source: Commission services. 
Finally, it is worth stressing that there is some 
evidence that financial markets have recently 
become more responsive to the net external 
financial asset position of euro-area countries. 
While significant proportions of net external 
financial assets are related to the private sector, 
the public sector, to the extent that it is perceived 
as a lender of last resort, can be affected by 
private sector debt. As Graph 44 shows, in the 
first two months of 2009, sovereign bond 
spreads appear to relate negatively to net external 
financial asset positions. Countries with greater 
external liabilities have significant sovereign 
spreads over Germany. External financial 
liabilities can explain 25% of the cross-section 
variation of spreads relative to Germany in the 
sample of the first 12 euro-area Member States. 
In contrast, prior to the current financial crisis, 
no significant relation between net external 
financial assets and sovereign bond spreads is 
visible in the euro area.19 
                                                     
 For a study on the determinants of sovereign bond 
spreads prior to the crisis, see M. Hallerberg and G.B. 
Graph 44: Net external financial assets and sovereign 
bond spreads, euro-area Member States  
(2001 and 2009) (1) 
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(1) For the 2009 observations, NFA assets are for 2007 while the 
spread refers to the first two months of 2009.  NFA are measured 
in difference to Germany, which had positive net assets of 16% of 
GDP in 2007 and had slightly negative net external assets in 2001. 
Source: Commission services. 
                                                                              
Wolff, 2008, 'Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and 
sovereign risk premia in EMU', Public Choice, 136(3), 379-
396. 
19
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4.  Assessing the size of the 
competitiveness adjustment ahead 
This section assesses the degree of over (or 
under)-valuation of real effective exchange rates 
in the euro area. As the extent of a 
competitiveness problem also depends on the 
speed and ease with which a country is able to 
correct it, the section also discusses possible 
differences in the capacity to adjust prices and 
competiveness. 
Measuring exchange rate misalignment 
Real effective exchange rate movements by 
themselves provide limited information on over- 
or undervaluation. Assessing the extent of 
competitiveness misalignments requires the 
computation of a benchmark against which 
actual developments in REER can be compared. 
A standard approach in the economic literature is 
to take as a benchmark some form of equilibrium 
real exchange rate that satisfies specific medium- 
to long-term macroeconomic conditions. There 
are a rather wide range of possible 
methodologies to estimate equilibrium REER, all 
of which have pros and cons.20 In this section, 
we follow two approaches developed mostly at 
the IMF: the current account norm approach 
(CAN) and the net foreign asset stabilisation 
(NFAS) approach. The two methodologies are 
based on an estimated benchmark "equilibrium" 
current account. The possible REER 
misalignment is then estimated as the change in 
the REER required to close the gap between the 
equilibrium and the actual value of the current 
account. The difference between the two 
approaches lies in the notion of the equilibrium 
current account concept used.  
• In the CAN approach, the current account 
that would prevail over the medium-to-long 
term is estimated on the basis of                                                      
20 For further information on the various methods, see, for 
example: 
  Clark, P., and R. McDonald (1998), 'Exchange rates and 
economic fundamentals: A methodological comparison 
of BEERs and FEERs', IMF Working Paper, 98/67,  
 Hansen J. and W. Roeger  (2000), 'Estimation of real 
equilibrium exchange rates', Economic Papers, 144, DG 
ECFIN, European Commission,  
 Isard, P. (2007), 'Equilibrium exchange rates: Assessment 
methodologies', IMF Working Paper, No 296.  
fundamentals related, for example, to the 
determinants of the saving-investment 
balance of the economy.21  
• In the NFAS approach, the benchmark 
current account is the one that guarantees 
the stabilisation of the NFA / GDP ratio at 
its current level.  
Table 5 displays the resulting estimates of the 
benchmark current accounts and the real 
exchange rate over-/undervaluation for the two 
methodologies.  
The CAN approach suggests, not entirely 
surprisingly, that the countries with the largest 
observed current account imbalances are also the 
ones that exhibit the most pronounced REER 
misalignments. The REERs for Greece and 
Spain and Portugal are estimated to be 
overvalued by about 12-13% and for France by 
around 7%. Conversely, countries with large 
current account surpluses tend to be 
undervalued. Germany's REER is estimated to 
be undervalued at around 13% below its 
equilibrium level and the Netherlands, Austria 
and Finland at around 6-7%.  
The over-/undervaluations estimated with the 
NFAS approach are broadly in line with the ones 
obtained by means of the current account norms. 
Not only is the sign of the misalignment the 
same, the order of magnitude is also generally 
relatively similar. Using the NFAS approach, the 
largest overvaluations are found for Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, while the undervaluations are 
largest for Germany and Finland. Overall, the 
results suggest that there is no major contrast 
between the predicted current account in line 
with fundamentals and the one obtained from 
the requirement of stabilising NFAs.22 
21 See, for example:  
 Chinn, M.D. and E.S. Prasad (2003), 'Medium-term 
determinants of current accounts in industrial and 
developing countries: an empirical exploration', Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 59, pp. 47-76,  
 and Lee, J., G.M. Milesi-Ferretti, J. Ostry, A. Prati, and L. 
Ricci (2008), 'Exchange rate assessments: CGER 
methodologies', IMF Occasional Paper, No 261. 
22 The NFA stabilisation approach yields equilibrium 
current account surpluses for countries with a positive 
NFA stock, and equilibrium current account deficits for 
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Summing up, the results of the different 
approaches robustly indicate strong 
overvaluation in some Member States (EL, ES, 
PT) and moderate overvaluation in others (FR), 
but they also point to cases of significant 
undervaluation (DE) and to more moderate 
undervaluation (NL, AT, FI). The last column of 
Table 5 provides a qualitative summary of the 
results of the two methods. While equilibrium 
real exchange rates and over- and undervaluation 
are notoriously difficult to compute, the fact that 
the two types of estimates shown in the table 
give similar results suggest that the results are 
fairly robust. 
 
 
                                                     
countries with a negative NFA stock on condition that 
the NFA stock is to be stabilised at the current level. This 
is the outcome of the basic algebra of NFA dynamics: the 
stabilising current account is proportional to their 
NFA/GDP ratio. The adjustment need is thus at the 
lower end since adjustment to a common NFA level for 
all Member States would imply significantly greater 
misalignments.  
Competitiveness adjustment is not just an 
exporters' story 
Price adjustments to external imbalances do not 
only involve the export sector, they also implicate 
the domestic non-tradable (sheltered) sector. 
Current accounts and REER are not only 
connected via the direct impact of the exchange 
rate on the capacity of exporting companies to 
compete on the world market but also via 
changes in the allocation of internal resources 
and demand.  
Indeed, economic theory ascribes a potentially 
important role to the non-tradable sector (i.e. the 
sector that is not directly exposed to foreign 
trade) in current account adjustments to external 
imbalances.23 The relative price of tradables and 
non-tradables within a country – the internal 
exchange rate – is a central variable for 
households' consumption choices and the 
allocation of productive factors at sectoral level. 
23 See, for example, Obstfeld M. and K. Rogoff (2004), 
'The unsustainable US current account position revisited', 
NBER working paper, No 10869. 
Table 5: Current accounts (CA), current account norms according to the CAN and NFAS approaches and 
estimated over-/undervaluation of the REER, euro-area Member States (1) 
 
Actual CA 
(% of GDP) 
Current account norms 
(% of GDP) 
Estimated over-/undervaluation of 
the REER (in %) 
Overall 
assessment 
(2) 
  CAN  
approach 
NFAS 
approach 
CAN  
approach 
NFAS  
approach 
 
BE -0.7 1.0 0.6 0.2 -0.1  
DE 7.1 -1.3 0.5 -12.4 -9.9 -- 
IE -5.7 -0.1 -0.5 4.0 3.7  
EL -13.4 -7.0 -5.3 12.8 16.7 ++ 
ES -9.4 -2.9 -3.2 13.3 12.5 ++ 
FR -3.8 -0.6 0.1 6.3 7.8 + 
IT -2.2 -2.0 0.0 0.2 4.4  
NL 8.4 1.8 1.4 -6.5 -6.9 - 
AT 3.1 -1.5 -0.6 -5.9 -5.0 - 
PT -11.8 -5.3 -3.0 11.5 15.5 ++ 
SK -6.0 -4.5 -3.1 -2.5 -1.6  
SI -6.0 -1.9 -1.3 1.9 2.4  
FI 4.2 -0.7 -0.8 -7.5 -7.6 - 
(1) No estimates for CY and MT due to lack of adequate data.  
(2) + (++) indicates (significant) overvaluation, while – (- -) indicates (significant) undervaluation.  
Source: Commission' services.  
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In principle, a decrease in the relative price of 
non-tradable goods and services or housing 
makes investment and production in the tradable 
sector comparatively more profitable, thereby 
improving the current account. At the same time, 
the fall in prices makes the consumption of 
services and housing relatively more attractive, 
which reduces the demand for imported tradable 
goods. Furthermore, lower non-tradable goods 
prices can also reduce prices in the tradable 
sector since they act as important inputs. 
The non-tradable component of the real 
exchange rate accounts for a significant share of 
observed fluctuations in real exchange rates. 
REER measures based on broad price/cost 
indicators such as the CPI, unit labour costs or 
the GDP deflator can be decomposed into a 
tradable and a non-tradable component. The first 
component – the so-called external exchange rate 
– measures the competitiveness of the tradable 
sector whereas the second – the internal 
exchange rate – captures changes in relative 
prices in the non-tradable and tradable sectors 
within a country.24 Available empirical studies for 
the US or the OECD show that non-tradable 
goods and service prices play a significant role in 
exchange rate fluctuations.25  
The issue of the role of non-tradables is 
particularly relevant for the euro area where, due 
to the elimination of intra-area nominal exchange 
rate fluctuations, the non-tradable component of 
the REER tends to be a comparatively larger 
source of fluctuations in the broad measures of 
the REER. This is shown in Graph 45, which 
displays the relative magnitude of the fluctuations 
in the tradable and non-tradable component of 
the intra-area REER. Since the introduction of 
the euro, the relative importance of non-tradable 
24  More precisely, the REER can be decomposed into the 
equations:  
REER = REERT × REERNT 
with: REERT = e×PT/P*T   
and REERNT = [(P/ PT) / (P* /P*T) 
where P stands for prices and the subscripts T, NT and * 
denote tradables, non-tradables and the world 
respectively. 
25  See, for example, Burstein, A., M. Eichenbaum and S. 
Rebelo (2005), 'The importance of non-tradable goods 
prices in cyclical real exchange rate fluctuations', CEPR 
discussion paper No 5306, October. 
prices as a driver of the real exchange rate has 
increased significantly in most Member States. 
There is empirical evidence that non-tradable 
prices – the internal exchange rate – do not only 
play an important role in fluctuations in the 
overall real exchange rate but also in 
developments in the current account and the 
trade balance. In fact, developments in the 
current account are much easier to explain when 
non-tradable prices are also taken into account. 
This can be illustrated in a simple correlation 
analysis, which shows that in the euro area the 
export-price-based REER is closely linked to the 
performance of the export sector but it is less 
strongly correlated with the current account than 
the broader measures of the REER (Table 6).  
Graph 45: Relative volatility (1) of the tradable and 
non-tradable components of the intra-area 
REER(2), euro-area Member States (in %). 
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(1) Ratio of volatility of the non-tradable component to volatility of 
the tradable component. Volatility is measured by the standard 
deviations of the annual changes in the corresponding components. 
(2) The REER is based on value added deflators. Non-tradable 
sectors are those with a trade intensity (i.e. [(imports + 
exports)/2]/value added) of less than 20%.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
Table 6: Correlations between various measures 
of the REERs and export growth or current 
accounts  
(Cross-sectional correlations across euro-area 
countries in %) 
 Export growth Changes in the current account 
REER based 
on: 
1994-
2008 
1998-
2008 
1994-
2008 
1998-
2008 
GDP deflators 18.3 -30.4 -63.2 -59.7 
Export prices -53.2 -63.3 -38.9 -33.3 
Source: Commission services. 
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Box 4: Real effective exchange rates and the trade balance 
 
To assess the relationship between real exchange rates (and particularly the prices of non-tradables relative to 
tradables) and the balance of goods and services, a panel of EU-15 countries plus AU, CA, CH, JP, NZ and the US 
in the period 1973-2007 is used. The data are taken from the Commission's AMECO database. The time-series 
properties of the data are investigated and indicate co-integration. As a co-integration framework is appropriate, we 
perform the estimation by dynamic ordinary least squares with one lead and one lag (DOLS(-1,1)), see Stock and 
Watson (1993), Kao and Chiang (2000) and a similar application in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002).  
The estimation results show that a significantly negative long-run relationship exists between the balance of goods 
and services and the real effective exchange rate. A one percent of GDP improvement in the balance of goods and 
services is associated with a depreciation in the real effective exchange rate based on GDP deflators of 0.9 percent 
(regression A). In contrast, for the narrow, export price-based REER, no significant relation to the balance of goods 
and services can be found (C). In other words, if non-tradable prices become relatively cheap, the balance will 
improve, while a depreciation of only tradable prices will not improve the current account. An increase in the 
relative GDP per capita level is associated with an appreciation. Regression B shows that the underlying relations 
between the balance of goods and services and the real exchange rate have not changed with EMU. Overall, the 
regression results show that broad measures of the exchange rate are significantly related to the balance of goods 
and services, while narrow ones are not. This suggests that non-tradable prices, which are included in broad 
measures but not in narrow ones, play a significant role for current account developments. Moreover, EMU does 
not appear to have changed these underlying relationships (see Ruscher and Wolff (2009) for details). 
  
 Panel estimates of determinants of the real effective exchange rate in OECD countries (1973-2007) 
 REER based on GDP deflator REER based on 
export price deflator 
 A B C
Balance of goods and services -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.000
 -3.58 -3.25 0.2
EMU* balance of goods and services (2) -0.003 
 -1.2 
Log of relative real per capita GDP 1.16*** 1.15*** 0.627***
 7.91 9.03 5.37
Relative productivity (3) 0.001 0.001 -0.002**
 0.45 0.71 -2.52
Oil exposure -0.008** -0.004 -0.008**
 -2.39 -1.19 -2.46
Sample92 *log of relative real GDP pc (5) -0.35*** 
 -6.04 
Sample92 (5) 0.05*** 
 3.35 
EMU (2) -0.04*** 
 -3.08 
N 504 504 504
r2 0.62 0.66 0.54
*** (**) indicate 1 (5)% significance. (1) Difference is the log difference between the broad and the narrow measure of the REER. (2) EMU is 
a dummy variable equal to one if a country has the euro in a given year. (3) Productivity of the economy relative to trading partners. (4) 
Domestic productivity of the industrial relative to the service sector. (5) Sample92 is a dummy that takes the value of 1 as of 1992 for all 
countries. t-values below the coefficient. 
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Furthermore, econometric analysis shows that 
measures of the real exchange rate that include 
only tradable prices are not significantly 
connected with the trade balance in OECD 
countries (Box 4). An improvement of the 
current account is not significantly related to a 
depreciation of the narrow, export price-based, 
REER. In contrast, broad measures of the 
REER, which include the relative price of non-
tradable goods, are significantly connected with 
the trade balance. An improvement of the trade 
balance is associated with a significant 
depreciation of the REER based on the GDP 
deflator and a fall in the relative price of non-
tradable goods and services. These results 
indicate that competitiveness and current 
accounts do not depend solely on the 
performance of exporting companies but are also 
closely connected with the internal allocation of 
resources and demand across the tradable and 
non-tradable sectors.26 
Adjustments to external imbalances will 
require a reallocation of resources and 
demand 
Based on the estimates of competitiveness 
misalignments presented in the previous section, 
significant adjustments in competitiveness and 
current accounts appear necessary in several 
euro-area Member States. In addition to changes 
in prices, the adjustment processes will involve 
significant reallocation of resources together with 
shifts and changes of aggregate demand. For 
example, a reduction in current account deficits 
involves both reductions in domestic demand 
and reallocations of supply and demand between 
the tradable and the non-tradable sectors. In 
some Member States, the need for such a 
reallocation process will be compounded by the 
fact that current account deficits have been 
associated with internal imbalances on the 
housing market and excessive use of resources in 
that sector.  
The ease with which resources can be reallocated 
in the economy will therefore play an 
instrumental role in determining the speed and 
                                                     26  For more details see Ruscher, E. and G.B. Wolff (2009), 
'External rebalancing is not just an exporters' story: real 
exchange rates, the non-tradable sector and the euro', 
European Commission, European Economy - Economic 
Paper, No 375 
the cost of adjustment. In principle, the more 
flexible markets are, the more easily the 
adjustment will take place. Flexibility in labour 
and product markets appears particularly 
important for workers and other resources to be 
moved easily from downsizing sectors to other 
sectors. However, the existence of significant 
fixed capital stocks and sector specific human 
capital may hinder smooth adjustment processes. 
For example, a construction sector that has 
grown far above its long-run sustainable level has 
a significant capital stock that cannot readily be 
used productively in other sectors of the 
economy. Germany’s experience after the 
reunification boom shows that it can take time to 
downsize an oversized construction sector. The 
adjustment can put a negative drag on economic 
growth for significant periods of time. 
Recent econometric evidence backs the idea of a 
link between labour market flexibility and 
competitiveness adjustment. In particular, it 
shows that the response of prices to changes in 
activity are either smaller or slower when the 
level of employment protection legislation, the 
minimum wage, the union density and the 
generosity of the unemployment benefits are 
higher.27 Tight product market regulations have a 
similar effect. This would suggest that 
competitiveness will adjust more quickly towards 
equilibrium in economies with lower levels of 
employment protection and product market 
regulation. 
Countries with the greatest adjustment needs 
are relatively regulated and faced with 
downward wage rigidities 
Adjustments ahead might therefore be 
particularly slow and costly in those countries 
with the highest adjustment needs and the most 
regulated labour markets. Indeed, countries with 
the highest level of labour market regulation in 
2006 also have the highest current account and 
exchange rate misalignments (Graph 46). 
Portugal, Greece and Spain still have relatively 
27  See European Commission - DG ECFIN (2008), 
'EMU@10: Successes and challenges after 10 years of 
Economic and Monetary Union', European Economy 2, 
Brussels, Belgium, p. 183. 
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regulated labour markets, which might actually 
lead to more protracted adjustment processes. 28  
Graph 46: Labour market regulation in euro-area 
countries (Index of employment protection 
legislation – 1998 and 2006) 
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Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004, OECD, Going for 
Growth, 2007. 
Moreover, there is some evidence that downward 
rigidity of wages may hinder adjustment 
processes, as it implies an asymmetric response 
of unit labour costs over the cycle. The response 
of the REER to cross-country differences in 
cyclical positions is asymmetric, responding more 
strongly to excess demand than to excess supply. 
In particular, econometric evidence shows that 
relative unit labour costs are more reactive over 
the cycle during expansions than during 
downturns in some Member States (e.g. EL, FR, 
IT, PT, and FI) while, in others, they react 
broadly symmetrically over the cycle (e.g. BE, IE, 
LU) or are even more reactive to downswings 
than upswings (AT, DE) (Graph 47).29 Since the 
introduction of the euro, downward rigidity of 
wages has contributed significantly to the 
divergence of real effective exchange rates. 
Overall, downward rigidity of wages implies that 
higher increases in unemployment are needed to 
                                                     
28  For a discussion of the possible contribution of structural 
and fiscal policies to adjustment in Spain, see, for 
example, Martinez-Mongay, C. and L. A. Maza Lasierra 
(2009), 'Competitiveness and growth in EMU: The role of 
the external sector in the adjustment of the Spanish 
economy', European Economy, Economic Paper, No 355, 
January. 
29  See 'Market adjustment: the competitiveness channel', 
Chapter 4 of 'The EU Economy 2006 Review', European 
Commission, European Economy 6/2006.  
achieve a required improvement in 
competitiveness. It also implies that adjustment 
to an overvalued exchange rate could be 
protracted and could involve significant cost in 
terms of temporary unemployment. 
Graph 47: Rigidity of relative unit labour costs in 
total economy (EA 12 Member States) (1) 
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(1) "Rigidity" is the difference between the elasticity in the growth 
of unit labour costs relative to other euro-area Member States to 
positive and negative output gaps. Output gap elasticities are 
estimated by regressing the change in a country's competitiveness 
vis-à-vis the remaining euro-area countries on the relative output 
gap and the lagged value of the competitiveness indicator, allowing 
for the coefficient of the output gap to vary across countries. Data 
are annual and cover the period 1970-2005. 
Source: Commission services. 
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5.  Is the financial turmoil speeding up 
adjustment to external imbalances in 
the euro area? 
The economic and financial crisis is seriously 
affecting the euro-area economy. This section 
attempts to assess the impact of the crisis on the 
adjustment of the external imbalances identified 
in this special report. To do so, it uses the 
European Commission Interim Forecast for 
2009-10 released last January. Such an 
assessment can, by its very nature, only be 
preliminary as the economic situation is changing 
fast and forecasts of the main underlying 
macroeconomic and financial variables are even 
more difficult and uncertain than usual. The 
section focuses on current account changes and 
some of their underlying determinants and on 
forecast changes in competitiveness. 
Graph 48: Current account positions in 2007 and 
change over 2007-10, euro-area Member States  
(in % of GDP) 
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(1) Change in current account from 2007 to 2010. 
Source: Commission services, 2010 data are based on January 2009 
forecast. 
For the crisis to lead to a reduction in the 
external imbalances of euro-area Member States, 
it should be associated with a reduction in 
current account deficits and surpluses. Graph 48 
shows the extent to which current accounts are 
projected to adjust until 2010 relative to their 
level in 2007. The graph does indeed suggest a 
significant degree of adjustment. Countries with 
large current account surpluses are expected to 
observe significant falls in their surpluses. The 
data indicate that the ratio of the current account 
to GDP should drop by 2.2% in Germany, 3.7% 
in the Netherlands and 3.1% in Finland. In 
contrast, some deficit countries are forecast to 
improve their current accounts over the period, 
most notably Ireland (+1.9%) and Spain (3.5%). 
On average, however, the estimated changes 
through to 2010 correct only 20% of the existing 
differences in deficits and surpluses. More recent 
data on trade figures suggest that the current 
account surplus of Germany could fall more 
significantly than projected due to collapsing 
world trade and demand. The estimated 
adjustment of the euro area could thus be larger.  
The adjustment is not primarily determined by 
differences in business cycle developments. 
Chart 48 shows that all countries are expected to 
see a significant worsening of their output gap, 
with most countries losing about 3-5% of their 
activity between 2007 and 2010 according to the 
January 2009 interim forecast. Despite these 
relatively similar changes in the output gap, 
current account developments are projected to 
differ substantially across countries.30 This 
suggests that the adjustment observed in 
Graph 48 could reflect some structural 
rebalancing and is not entirely a temporary 
cyclical phenomenon. 
Graph 49: Changes in current account and output 
gap, euro-area Member States (1) 
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(1) Current account and output gap are measured in % of GDP 
Source: Commission services, 2010 data are based on January 2009 
forecast. 
In principle, adjustment could be driven by 
changes in exports as well as changes in imports. 
Section 2 showed that domestic demand was a 
                                                     
30  The development of GDP relative to trading partners 
paints a similar picture. 
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central factor driving current accounts prior to 
the onset of the crisis. Some countries with 
significant current account deficits in 2007 are 
projected to see a fall in domestic demand 
relative to the rest of the euro area over the 
forecast period. This holds true in particular for 
Ireland and to some extent for Spain and Italy. 
Moreover, households are very actively adjusting 
their savings. In Ireland and Spain, the net 
lending of households to the rest of the economy 
is forecast to increase by 12.9% and 4.7% of 
GDP from 2007 to 2010 (Greek data are not 
available). The resulting downward pressure in 
demand will lead to an improvement in the 
current account of these deficit countries.  
Of the surplus countries, only Finland will 
experience a sizeable increase in relative domestic 
demand, while, for Germany and the 
Netherlands, relative domestic demand will 
increase only modestly. This suggests that some 
of the reduction of the current account surplus in 
surplus countries is significantly driven by falls in 
export demand rather than strong domestic 
demand pressures.  
Moreover, the estimation results presented in 
Box 3 suggest a significant link between house 
prices and current accounts. In line with these 
econometric results, most countries that have 
experienced strong housing booms in recent 
years are projected to see substantial corrections 
in their current accounts over 2009-10.  
The cooling-off of demand pressures related to 
housing bubbles in some Member States is also 
visible in credit data. A prime driver of house 
markets is the extension of credit to the 
economy. Growth of loans to the non-financial, 
private sector has fallen significantly in countries 
with large current account deficits (Graph 50). 
Growth of credit to household, which reflects to 
a large extent mortgages, has sharply decelerated 
over the last couple of years in some of the 
Member States identified in this special report as 
countries with competitiveness problems (BE, 
IE, EL and ES). The slowdown of credit has put 
a brake on housing and domestic demand in the 
countries concerned. In contrast, credit figures to 
the private non-financial sector gained significant 
momentum in Germany from mid-2007 to mid-
2008 (Graph 50), although these’ have subsided 
again since September 2008.  
Graph 50: Loan growth to the non-financial private 
sector in the EA and selected Member States  
(y-o-y growth – Sep 1998 to Jan 2009) (1) 
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(1) Growth of loans by monetary and financial institutions to "other 
euro-area residents".  
Source: ECB statistics. 
 
Graph 51: Change in credit growth to private sector 
and net foreign assets, 
 euro-area Member States(1) 
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(1) Change in annual credit growth between January 2008 and 
January 2009. Private sector includes non-financial corporations, 
households, non-monetary financial intermediaries other than 
insurance corporations and pension funds and insurance 
corporations and pension funds.  
Source: ECB, Commission services. 
Overall, credit data point to a certain correction 
of some of the domestic imbalances underlying 
competitiveness problems. Correction of the 
debt overhang had started before the onset of 
the financial turmoil, but it has clearly been 
boosted by the changes in risk behaviour brought 
by the global crisis. There is evidence, for 
example, that credit in euro-area countries is now 
responding to the level of external debt of the 
countries considered. Graph 51 suggests, in 
particular, that countries with large net liabilities 
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have seen comparatively sharper falls in the 
credit dynamics of their non-financial private 
sector. Moreover, credit dynamics have also 
reacted to the absolute external debt levels. 
Credit growth has dropped sharply in both 
Ireland and Belgium, both of which have 
comparatively large gross external debt levels.31 
A likely interpretation is that the global financial 
turmoil is forcing a deleveraging of the private 
sector in those countries which post the highest 
international financial exposure, i.e. those which 
have high levels of (net) debt relative to the rest 
of the world. In this sense, the credit figures 
provide some tentative evidence of changes in 
leverage ratios across the euro area and therefore 
of the correction of some of the key domestic 
imbalances that underlie competitiveness 
problems. 
The current crisis, however, has so far brought 
only limited adjustment in effective exchange 
rates. Graph 52 shows that REER are not 
forecast to move firmly in the direction of 
closing estimated over- (or under-) valuations 
during the period 2007-10. On the contrary, 
most countries with overvalued real exchange 
rates are expected to lose further competitiveness 
while undervalued economies will continue to 
gain competitiveness. The only exception is 
Ireland, which will clearly regain competitiveness 
and is expected to close its competitiveness gap 
by 2010. It is worth noting that unit labour costs 
(ULC) are projected to go some way to 
rebalancing existing competitiveness disequilibria. 
In particular, Germany is forecast to experience 
growth in ULC above the euro-area average in 
2009. Conversely, France and Spain are expected 
to see slower growth in ULC than their main 
trading partners in 2009 and 2009-2010, 
respectively. This rebalancing of labour costs will, 
however, be offset by opposite movements in 
profit margins, leading to only limited 
rebalancing of the measures of REER based on 
prices (GDP or export deflators).  
The forecast therefore suggests that ongoing 
adjustments in the current account are not 
primarily driven by price changes. Rather, the 
adjustment is determined by rapidly falling 
31 However, in the Netherlands, credit growth numbers 
have not fallen much recently even though the absolute 
debt level is high.  
domestic demand in deficit countries and some 
reductions in exports. The absence of the 
necessary price adjustment suggests that the 
ongoing crisis will take an even bigger toll in 
terms of unemployment and underutilisation of 
capital in countries suffering from external 
imbalances than in the rest of the euro area. 
Graph 52: Exchange rate adjustment and over-
undervaluation, euro-area Member States (1) 
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(1) REER against the other euro-area Member States (EA 16) based 
on the GDP deflator. Over-/undervaluation as measured by the 
CAN approach shown in Table 5.  
Source: Commission services, 2010 data are based on January 2009 
forecast. 
Overall, the turmoil is, to some extent, speeding 
up adjustment to external imbalances within the 
euro area although it is only doing so partially 
and at a high cost. According to the forecast, 
current account divergence within the euro area 
should diminish between 2008 and 2010 
although Member State differences should 
remain high at the end of the period. This 
moderate convergence in current account 
positions reflects country differences in domestic 
demand developments and the extent of 
deleveraging in the private sector. The correction 
of some domestic imbalances, notably in credit 
and housing markets, has not, however, been 
associated with significant changes in price 
competitiveness so far. While some moderate 
adjustments of unit labour cost developments are 
forecast for 2009, country differences in price 
competitiveness are projected to remain high 
over the forecast horizon. The absence of price 
adjustment means that the projected (partial) 
correction of current account imbalances within 
the euro area might be achieved with high costs 
in terms of unemployment and underutilisation 
of capital. 
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6.  Overall assessment and policy 
implications 
Over the past decade, the euro area has 
experienced significant divergence in the external 
economic performance of its individual Member 
States, notably in terms of price competitiveness 
but also with respect to current accounts and 
external foreign asset positions.  
The diverging trend can be ascribed to a range of 
factors, some of which reflect a normal and 
healthy functioning of the euro-area economy. 
For example, changes in price competitiveness 
partly reflect cross-border convergence in the 
price level of tradable goods, Balassa-Samuleson 
effects and a healthy response to cyclical 
differences between Member States. Similarly, 
the euro has facilitated the divergence in current 
accounts by giving euro-area catching-up 
economies better access to international capital 
markets and allowing them to run larger trade 
deficits than in the rest of the OECD.  
However, the divergence trend also has less 
benign causes which warrant close monitoring. 
Differences in price competitiveness or current 
accounts can indeed also be related to the build-
up of a range of domestic macroeconomic 
imbalances in some Member States. With a mix 
that varies depending on the countries 
considered, these imbalances include 
inappropriate responses of wages to country-
specific shocks, the build-up of high private 
sector and external debt and surging house 
prices. Although catching-up economies in the 
euro area have benefited from large capital 
inflows, foreign capital has not always been 
channelled to the most productive uses, with 
capital inflows having sometimes been used 
primarily for consumption or housing 
investment. Some of the macroeconomic 
imbalances underlying competitiveness problems, 
notably surging housing prices and private-sector 
debt, have also increased vulnerability to abrupt 
changes in financial market conditions and have 
therefore aggravated exposure to the ongoing 
financial turmoil.  
Estimates of equilibrium real exchange rates 
suggest that real effective exchange rates might 
be overvalued by as much as 10-15% in some 
Member States and undervalued by 5-10% in 
others. Hence, adjusting to external imbalances 
will probably require a substantial rebalancing of 
relative prices within the euro area. This 
adjustment will not only involve cuts in 
production costs and prices in the export sector, 
it will also imply changes in the domestic part of 
the economy concerned. In particular, there will 
be a need for reallocation of demand and 
productive resources between the sheltered 
sector and the export sector, as well as changes in 
relative prices between these two sectors. The 
speed and the economic cost of the adjustment 
will therefore depend both on the degree of price 
and wage flexibility and on the ease with which 
resources can be reallocated across sectors in the 
countries considered. In this respect, it is of 
some concern that Member States facing large 
adjustment needs generally exhibit a level of 
product and labour market regulation above the 
– already high – euro-area average. Furthermore, 
empirical evidence shows that wages are generally 
more rigid downwards than upwards, a factor 
which could lengthen the adjustment period in 
Member States that need to improve their price 
competitiveness. 
The ongoing financial turmoil seems, to some 
extent, to be speeding up adjustment to external 
imbalances within the euro area but it is only 
doing so partially and at a high cost. According 
to the latest European Commission interim 
forecast, some moderate convergence in current 
accounts should take place in 2009-10 as the 
financial turmoil forces the correction of some 
domestic imbalances in credit and housing 
markets. However, the adjustment will take place 
with only limited rebalancing in price 
competitiveness and will therefore come at a high 
cost in terms of unemployment and 
underutilisation of capital. 
A number of broad policy implications can be 
derived from the analysis presented here in terms 
of product and labour market functioning, and 
also fiscal policy and surveillance of inflows of 
foreign capital.  
Policies geared to improving the functioning of 
product and labour markets would help to 
contain divergences in competitiveness and to 
facilitate adjustments. Restoring competitiveness 
will be easier if resources can be mobilised more 
efficiently in order to raise productivity and 
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reduce labour costs. This is true both for the 
export sector and also for the non-tradable 
sector, which will play an important role in 
adjustment processes. This suggests that policies 
should also aim to improve productivity, 
flexibility and/or competition outside the export 
sector. Against this background, policies that 
promote competition in the services sector (still 
largely non-tradable) appear to be of particular 
importance. 
As regards fiscal policy, it is essential to avoid 
instances of pro-cyclicality, and to take more 
account of the impact of asset price 
developments on fiscal revenues. Experiences in 
the euro area so far show that fiscal policy can 
help to manage catching-up processes more 
effectively and to halt the build-up of imbalances, 
although this may not be enough on its own. 
Adjustment processes in response to large 
external imbalances also need to be taken into 
account when assessing fiscal positions in order 
to avoid policy mistakes that would further 
worsen competitiveness and the structural 
budgetary situation. 
On the financing of current account deficits in 
catching-up economies, more needs to be done, 
in terms of both surveillance and structural 
measures, to avoid the build-up of 
competitiveness imbalances. Excessive 
channelling of capital inflows to households 
comes with two types of risks. First, massive 
flows of foreign capital in the housing sector can 
lead to the formation of housing bubbles and the 
build-up of excessive household debt. Such 
imbalances are costly and lengthy to resolve and 
require significant reallocation of labour and 
capital across sectors, in particular from the 
construction sector to the other sectors in the 
economy. They also raise the vulnerability of the 
economy to abrupt changes in financial market 
conditions. Second, even in the absence of a 
housing bubble, the use of foreign capital for 
consumption or housing investment purposes 
raises concerns about the missing benefits of 
alternative, more productive, uses of foreign 
capital.  
Overall, there is therefore a need to take into 
account asset markets and private-sector balance 
sheets in competitiveness surveillance exercises. 
Furthermore, there is also a need to identify the 
structural and fiscal factors that may help to 
make the household sector more attractive to 
foreign capital than the corporate sector. 
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